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INTRODUCTION
When our Founding Fathers, in the summer of 1787, de-
vised our constitutional system of government, they had two pri-
mary goals. One objective was to secure public liberty or safety;
that is, protection and defense of the Union. The other was to
protect liberty in the republican sense. By this, I mean individ-
ual liberty of citizens or of states.
Under the king of England, the experience from which the
Framers drew guidance, British subjects enjoyed public safety
but not republican liberty.1 Although the Articles of Confedera-
tion secured individual liberties, the Confederate Congress, de-
pendent upon the several states, was powerless to protect public
liberty.2 Accordingly, the Framers, to secure both public and pri-
vate liberty, formed a new system for our government. Under
our Constitution, the President, like the British monarch, has
the power to protect and to defend the nation. Congress, how-
ever, acts as a buffer between the executive, on the one hand,
and the people and the states, on the other. It protects republi-
can liberty from possible presidential oppression.
This basis for the separation of powers explains the differ-
ent roles of the political branches of the federal government
with respect to war, which is the focus of this article. The alloca-
tion of war powers is a subject of frequent debate, most recently
in the period leading to the war with Iraq. Because that war was
concluded successfully, with great speed and with a minimal loss
of American lives, the domestic political and constitutional de-
See, e.g., note 36 and accompanying text infra.
2 See, e.g., notes 105, 220 and accompanying text infra.
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bate has largely evaporated.
The purpose of this article is to explain, prior to any future
national debate, the constitutional allocation of war powers. It is
the faint hope of the author that new insights into the separa-
tion of powers of the political branches of the federal govern-
ment, specifically in the context of war powers, will emerge and
will elucidate a little understood area of constitutional law.
The first section of the article will discuss various principles
that govern the division of authority with respect to war powers.
This should serve as an overview for the remainder of the work.
The following will be shown: The powers of the national govern-
ment were separated to achieve liberty. Liberty, as mentioned, is
a dichotomous concept covering both public liberty and liberty
in the republican sense, that is, liberty of individual citizens and
states. The President has not only the power, but also the duty,
to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation.3 He is "the general
Guardian of the National interests. ' 4 The members of the legis-
lature, on the other hand, acting by majority vote, are "more
immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liber-
ties of the people."5 Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief is re-
sponsible for "the employment of the common strength"0 to pro-
tect public liberty. Congress protects private, or republican,
liberty.
The second portion of the article will examine the com-
mander-in-chief power, an authority that enables the President
to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation by war. The two
subsequent sections must be consulted for a complete under-
standing of this power and of how it fits into the constitutional
scheme. Respectively, these sections explore legislative checks
upon the executive's public war power-to secure private safety
from presidential oppression-and the publicly authorized, pri-
3 See notes 87-102 and accompanying text infra.
4 JAMEs MADisoN, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CoNvmNON OF 1787, at 60
(Gouverneur Morris) (Ohio Univ. Press rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter MADIsoN's NOTES]. (I
have reprinted Madison's Notes without changing the punctuation, spelling, or grammat-
ical usage. Therefore, all errors of such nature remain as reported. In other words, I am
placing the blame for such mistakes on Madison.).
'THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Mod.
Libr. ed. 1941). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Congress "prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated.").
0 THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 5, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton).
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vate war power of Congress.
In essence, the Constitution separates, from the power of
the sword, the power of the purse and other powers that directly
infringe upon an individual's rights to life, liberty, and prop-
erty.7 In other words, to protect republican liberty from execu-
tive encroachments, the means of war that require direct requi-
sitions on the people and on the states are placed in the control
of the legislators as guardians of the rights and liberties of the
citizens. Only after the legislature makes these incursions into
private rights are the means of war put under the command of
the protector and defender of public safety. Thus, for example,
Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes for the common
defense and the authority to raise armies. Once an army and
money for its support are raised, to secure public liberty, they
are placed under the President's authority.
The armed forces of the United States-the sword or com-
mon strength-therefore constitutionally may be directed and
deployed by their Commander-in-Chief as, in his discretion, is
best suited to "protect and defend" national interests. Without
congressional consent, however, he may not conscript private in-
dividuals into the armed forces of the United States; further-
more, the President constitutionally may not authorize private
acts of war. Because Congress, which prescribes rules by which
the rights and duties of citizens are regulated, protects private
security or liberty, it is the public authority that may grant indi-
viduals the right to commit private acts of war to redress inju-
ries incurred by them as individuals. Thus, the legislature may
grant letters of marque and reprisal authorizing limited hostili-
ties to be carried out by private persons. It also may decide what
private injuries, sustained by U.S. citizens and caused by indi-
viduals of another nation, warrant public war against that na-
tion, with which we are at peace, for refusing to redress the inju-
ries of our citizens. That, as well as conferring certain rights and
obligations upon our citizenry in any war, is the function of Con-
gress's power to declare war.
This article will demonstrate that a proper understanding of
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 5, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton)
("The Executive ... holds the sword of the community. The legislature ... commands
the purse .... ); MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 81 (Col. George Mason) ("The
purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands .. ").
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the constitutional allocation of war powers must lead to the con-
clusion that no declaration of war would have been required, for
example, for the President to attack Iraq or Iraqi-controlled Ku-
wait. It would be within the President's power to employ the
common strength to "protect and defend" the nation, its inter-
ests, and its citizens in Iraq or in Iraqi-controlled Kuwait. Such
attack would be carried out only by U.S. armed forces, for the
purpose of retaliating against Iraqi aggression, to protect public
liberty. The power to defend, as will be shown, includes collec-
tive self-defense, s which was a significant attribute of our effort
in the Persian Gulf. In addition to restoring equilibrium in the
region, an attack against Saddam Hussein (or the like) and his
forces also could be for the purpose of punishing a delinquent
nation. No declaration of war is necessary to conduct war on any
of these grounds.9
I BASIC PRINCIPLES: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Executive Power
The first words of Article HI, Section 1, of the Constitution
are these: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." By this clause, the President is
constitutionally granted "the whole Executive power."10
While the general grant of authority to the federal judiciary
is similarly worded,11 the one that confers legislative powers
See note 403 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 160-62, 401, 403 and accompanying text infra.
10 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862). See also Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Article H, Section 1, Clause 1, "does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power" is vested in the Presi-
dent); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 550-51 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[The President is made the sole repository of the executive powers of the
United States, and the powers entrusted to him as well as the duties imposed upon him
are awesome indeed."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure
Case), 343 U.S. 579, 681 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) ('"The whole of the 'executive
Power' is vested in the President."). Cf. THE FEDEaaisr No. 69, supra note 5, at 446
(Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested
in a single magistrate.").
" U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1, cL 1: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish." The constitutionally created court has original jurisdiction
"[i]n all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party.. . ." Id. § 2, ci. 2. Otherwise, the authority of the federal
judiciary depends on Congress, though Section 2 of Article III expressly defines the
1992]
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upon Congress is noticeably different in form. Article I, Section
1, reads: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives."' 2 The plain import of these
words is that the Constitution vests specific legislative powers in
Congress to be exercised by both houses of the legislative
branch. These grants of authority, in general, may be found in
Section 8 of Article I. Other powers, carried out by one house
and not legislative in nature, are, when not strictly for internal
regulation, checks upon the past conduct of the other branches
of government."3 The powers of Congress, in all respects, are cir-
cumscribed carefully and do not extend to all legislative subjects
of national concern.
While the President's power is defined and its general ob-
jects are stated clearly (of which the Chief Executive is re-
minded before taking office, by mandate of the Constitution),' 4
for the fulfillment of his constitutional function, the President
must find his own means.
In Myers v. United States, 5 Chief Justice Taft, speaking
for the Court, cited with approval Alexander Hamilton's argu-
ment on executive power in relation to the constitutionality of
President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation during the war
between Great Britain and France. Hamilton discussed the dif-
ference between the general grants of power to Congress and to
the President arising from the nature of each authority:
The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive
authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would
render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was
designed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The
different mode of expression employed in the Constitution... serves
boundaries of all "judicial Power." Unlike the judicial branch, where authority is vested
also in such inferior courts as are established, all executive authority resides in the Chief
Executive. The President's executive authority does not depend upon an act of Congress.
It has been said that "[t]he limits of presidential power are obscure." The Steel
Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 661 (Clark, J., concurring). It is the hope (again faint) of the
author that this article will help to clarify the extent of presidential war-making powers.
12 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
3 The House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment, id. § 2, cl. 5,
and the Senate has the sole power to try impeachments, id. § 3, cl. 6, and has the power
to ratify treaties and nominations, id. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
14 See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
18 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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to confirm this inference. In [Article I] the expressions are "All legis-
lative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the
United States." In [Article IIl the expressions are "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States." The enu-
meration ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to
specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive
power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution, and
with the principles of free government.'0
The powers of Congress are delineated carefully; the President's
are defined but not enumerated. The reason for this difference
stems from the distinction between the nature of executive and
of legislative power in our republican system. The President, to
"preserve, protect and defend" the nation, must respond to
events; Congress enacts laws for future regulation of citizens and
of states.
B. Separation of Powers
The allocation of authority among the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the federal government suggests a sepa-
ration of national powers among those departments. 17 To under-
"8 Id. at 138-39. But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the word "all" in general grant of legislative power); The Steel Seizure
Case, 343 U.S. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring) (same); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 91 (1890)
(Lamar, J., dissenting) (same). Dissenting in Myers, Justice McReynolds wrote:
When this Article went to the Committee on Style [at the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787] it provided: "The legislative power shall be vested in a Con-
gress," etc. The words "herein granted" were inserted by the committee Sep-
tember 12, and there is nothing whatever to indicate that anybody supposed
this radically changed what already had been agreed upon. The same form of
words was used as to the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the draft
referred to the Committee on Style. The difference between the reported and
final drafts was treated as unimportant.
272 U.S. at 230-31. Aside from disregarding the plain language of the clause, the specific
delineation of legislative powers, found in Article I, Section 8, and the fact that the dele-
gates to the Convention decided at the start that it was necessary to enumerate carefully
the limits of legislative power in the federal government, see MADISON'S NOTES, supra
note 4, at 43-44, Justice McReynold's argument defeats itself. There must be some sig-
nificance attached to the change in the wording of the clause related to legislative power,
because those concerning executive and judicial authority remained the same. The
'change manifests the Framers' fear that, absent this emphasis upon the limits of its
power, the legislature would arrogate authority unto itself.
" See, e.g., Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928) (legislature
cannot usurp executive power of appointment). See also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US.
1, 124 (1976) (per curiam) ("The principle of separation of powers was not simply an
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stand the separation of constitutional powers in general, and of
war powers, in particular, one must comprehend the basis upon
which the powers were distributed. It does not suffice to believe
that authority was divided simply according to its character as
legislative, executive, or judicial. Indeed, as James Madison
wrote in The Federalist, an authoritative, contemporary exposi-
tion of the Constitution,18 "no skill in the science of government
has yet been able to discriminate and defin6, with sufficient cer-
tainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and
judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different legis-
lative branches."' 9 These words were not intended to justify the
fact that the founders of our republic spent the entire summer
of 1787 in Philadelphia debating and struggling over the frame-
work of government to be ordained and established. Indeed, as I
intend to demonstrate, in relation to war powers, the genius of
the Founding Fathers is not found in the nature and extent of
the powers that they gave to the general government, which fol-
lowed from necessity and, generally, existed prior to the Consti-
tution."0 Rather, it is found in the distribution of those powers.
It took the entire summer of 1787 to devise this delicate scheme
of government, and our history proves that the result was well
worth even a summer in Philadelphia.
For the Framers, "the doctrine of separation of powers was
not mere theory; it was a felt necessity."'"
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Execu-
tive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of
government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hy-
draulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to ex-
ceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objec-
abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document that
they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.").
"' Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821).
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 5, at 229 (James Madison).
20 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 40, supra note 5, at 255 (James Madison) ("[T]he
great principles of the Constitution ... may be considered less as absolutely new, than
as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation."); id. No.
45, at 303 (James Madison) ("If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and
candor, it, will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the
addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL
POWERS.").
21 The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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tives, must be resisted.2 2
The separation of powers of the federal government defines the
sphere of authority of each branch.2 3 When one department ex-
ercises power within its sphere, it does so without restraint of a'
coordinate branch, unless the Constitution grants to the latter a
prior or a subsequent check upon the former's otherwise inde-
pendent authority.24 This freedom from restraint by one or both
of the other branches is the necessary result of the doctrine of
separation of powers. "The sound application of a principle that
makes one master in his own house precludes him from impos-
ing his control in the house of another who is master there. '1 25 If
one branch imposes such control in the house of another, its ac-
tion-a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers-is
unconstitutional.2
The powers delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution were divided for the dual purposes of securing per-
sonal and public liberties. The fear of blending executive, legis-
lative, and judicial powers is the fear of placing all or any two
completely in the hands of one political body. Madison makes
this point in The Federalist by citing "the celebrated Montes-
I Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Cr.
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) ("The existence... of occa-
sional provisions expressly giving to one of the departments powers which by their na-
ture otherwise would fall within the general scope of the authority of another depart-
ment emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of this
basic rule" of separated powers.); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926)
("[Tihe reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution
should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively require3.").
21 Cf. The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The separation of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to unde-
fined provisions in the frame of our government").
24 See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1872) (pardon power
not subject to control of Congress). See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61
(1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The essential purpose of the separation of powers is
to allow for independent functioning of each coequal branch of government within its
assigned sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation
by other branches.").
'5 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935). Cf. Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1820) ("I am altogether incapable of comprehending
how two distinct wills can, at the same time, be exercised in relation to the same subject,
to be effectual, and at the same time compatible with each other.").
"' See, e.g., Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th
Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto case).
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quieu" whom he describes as "[t]he oracle who is always con-
sulted and cited on this subject. '2 7 The Framers, by accepting
Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers, used Montes-
quieu's guide, the British Constitution, as a prototype of our
own.2 8 Madison explained that, from the British Constitution, it
may clearly be inferred that, in saying
"there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive pow-
ers," [Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to
have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other.
His meaning, as his own words import ... can amount to no more
than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another depart-
ment, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted.2 9
In sum, a unified executive and legislative arm of government,
which could "enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyran-
nical manner," 30 is (like a sole legislative and judicial arm) dan-
gerous to private liberty.
This is consonant with the principles laid down by Judge
Blackstone, whose views, as set forth in his treatise on the Brit-
ish Constitution, were accepted as authoritative by the delegates
to the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.31 Blackstone wrote that
[i]n all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy, or the right
both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the
same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two
powers are united together, there can be no public liberty.32
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 5, at 313 (James Madison).
28 Id. at 313-14.
29 Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315 (Charles de Montesquieu) (emphasis omitted). See CHARLES DE MON-
TESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 202 (U. Cal. Press ed. 1977).
"' Accord Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26 (1957) ("Sir William Blackstone . . .ex-
erted considerable influence on the Founders"). Blackstone was cited several times in
The Federalist, see THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 5, at 448, 450 (Alexander Hamil-
ton); id. No. 84, at 557 (Alexander Hamilton), and was referred to by delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention in their notes on the proceedings, see MADISON'S NOTES, supra
note 4, at 547; ROBERT YATES, SECREr PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO
FORM THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PHILADELPHIA 1787 186 (George R. Stewart, ed., 1987)
[hereinafter SECRET PROCEEDINGS]. There can be no doubt that, at the time, he was con-
sidered to be a reliable authority.
2 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146.
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Madison, Montesquieu, and Blackstone agreed that the legisla-
tive and executive powers must be divided to preserve both pub-
lic and private liberties.
Elsewhere in the Commentaries, Blackstone noted that the
judicial power should not be joined with the legislative.33 If the
judiciary were joined entirely with the legislative branch, there
would be no private, or personal, liberty, because the judiciary
would be able to legislate (as some advocates of individual, or
civil, rights today apparently would prefer despite its danger to
private liberty). Judges would not be bound by the rules and
regulations, affecting life, liberty, and property, enacted by a
separate, legislative body. Like Montesquieu, Blackstone agreed
that a combination of the executive and the judiciary in one de-
partment "might soon be an overbalance for the legislative."'
This also would be inimical to republican (or private) liberty.
The harms of inadequately separated branches of govern-
ment were raised in the Convention. Madison, in his Notes of
Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, reports his own
words:
Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately exer-
cised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is
the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive [should] be in-
dependent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A coali-
tion of the two former powers would be more immediately & certainly
dangerous to public liberty."
Combining executive and legislative powers in one body of gov-
ernment is dangerous to both public and private liberty, while a
coalition of legislative and judicial authority threatens only pri-
vate liberty. The good of the whole-public liberty-takes pre-
-" 1 id. at *269.
1 id. This "overbalance," or oppression, would result from putting the public
prosecution and judicial functions in the same hands. Id.
MADISON's NOTES, supra note 4, at 326-27. See also id. at 311-12 (Two reasons
why a union of the executive and the legislature is more dangerous than combining the
executive and the judiciary are that "the collective interest & security were much more
in the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary" and that "in the adminis-
tration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in the
administration of the latter."); id. at 339 (Gouverneur Morris "concurred in thinking the
public liberty in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than from any other source.
It had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied on as the proper Guardians of
[private] liberty.").
19921
1094 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67: 1083
cedence over the good of a part-private liberty.30 Therefore,
Madison believed that a coalition that is dangerous to public lib-
erty is a greater concern than a coalition that endangers private
liberty. However, under our system of government, this general
proposition is tempered by a very high regard for personal
liberty.
C. The Preamble
On Monday, August 6, 1787, a printed copy of the draft of
the Constitution, prepared by the Committee of Detail at the
Convention, was delivered to each delegate. It read, in part, as
follows:
We the people of the States... do ordain, declare, and establish the
following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our
Posterity. 8
The Committee of Style later rephrased the preamble, 9 which,
in the Constitution, reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.40
The people solemnly established by the Constitution a "more
perfect Union." The Constitution established not only a union of
states, which had existed under the Articles of Confederation,
but also a union of all of the people. 41 The Articles of Confedera-
' Blackstone quoted John Locke:
[T]he harm which the sovereign can do in his own person not being likely to
happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to
subvert the laws, nor oppress the body of the people ... the inconveniency
therefore of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a
heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the
public and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate,
being thus set out of the reach of danger.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *243. Under our system of government, however,
further precautions are taken to prevent such "particular mischiefs."
" MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 385.
38 Id.
:9 Id. at 616.
40 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
41 Cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION ("Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union
between the States of New Hampshire .... ).
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tion directly operated upon, and by virtue of, the states; under
the Constitution, rights and duties are delegated by the people.
The acts of the federal government, created by the Constitution,
directly affect the people as well as the states. Th6 Constitution
was established, as Edmund Randolph of Virginia suggested
early in the deliberations of the Convention, as part of the plan
prepared by the delegates of his state, "to accomplish the ob-
ject proposed by [the] institution [of the Articles of Confedera-
tion]; namely, 'common defence, security of liberty and general
welfare.' ,,42 It was to "secure these rights"--"Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness"-that "the thirteen united States of
America" declared their independence from Great Britain.' 3
The preamble sets forth the objects of the federal govern-
ment but is not "the source of any substantive power conferred
on the Government of the United States, or in any of its Depart-
ments. 44 Any power entrusted to any branch of government, to
fulfill the enunciated ends, must be found in an express or im-
plied delegation of power by the Constitution. 5 Chief Justice
42 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 30. See also ARTICLES OF CONFDERATION, art.
The said states... enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and gen-
eral welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to,
or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty,
trade, or any other pretence whatever.
43 THE DECLAIATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
" Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 290 (1936) (preamble of act of Congress is not legislation but only "recital
of considerations which in the opinion of that body existed and justified the expression
of its will in the present act. Nevertheless this preamble may not be disregarded. . . .'I
(emphasis omitted); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 631 (1818) C'The
title of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in
the mind of the legislature . . . ."). However, "[i]f the preamble is contradicted by the
enacting clause, as to the intention of the legislature, [the enacting clause] must prevail,
on the principle that the legislature changed their intention." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 233 (1796) (Chase, J.). There is no danger of such contradiction when inter-
preting the Constitution, save for the amendments. See notes 62-63 infra. Therefore, the
substantive provisions should be construed to fulfill the objects of the general govern-
ment as elucidated by the preamble. In any case, it is a general rule of construction that,
if the words or effect and operation, of the enacting clause, are ambiguous or
doubtful, such construction should be made as not to extend the provisions in
the enacting clause, beyond the intention of the legislature, so clearly ex-
pressed in the preamble.
Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 233. Similarly, the Constitution should be interpreted by refer-
ence to- its intention, clearly expressed in the preamble.
41 See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.
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Hughes found in the preamble this guide for the government of
the United States:
One of the objects of "a more perfect Union" was "to provide for the
common defence." A nation which could not fight would be powerless
to secure "the Blessings of Liberty to Ourselves and our Posterity."
Self-preservation is the first law of national life and the constitution
itself provides the necessary powers in order to defend and preserve
the United States. Otherwise, as Mr. Justice Story said, "the country
would be in danger of losing both its liberty and its sovereignty from
its dread of investing the public councils with the power of defending
it. It would be more willing to submit to foreign conquest than to do-
mestic rule."'"
Thus, the Constitution was crafted, in large part, to provide for
the common defense.
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention suffered from
no delusion that the world would remain fixed forever by the
concerns or by the limitations of the period in which they lived.
James Madison and others consistently reminded their fellow
members of the Convention that, "[i]n framing a system which
we wish to last for ages, we [should] not lose sight of changes
which ages will produce. 47 Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted
words express this proposition: The "constitution [is] intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs."4 Our Constitution's adapt-
46 Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 REPs. A.B.A. 232, 232
(1917). See also note 246 and accompanying text infra.
17 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 194. See also id. at 240 (Gouverneur Morris)
("He wished gentlemen to extend their views beyond the present moment of time; be-
yond the narrow limits of place from which they derive their political origin .... We
must look forward to the effects of what we do. These alone ought to guide us."); id. at
376 (James Wilson) ("We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future
generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment."); id. at 551
(John Rutledge) ("As we are laying the foundation for a great empire, we ought to take a
permanent view of the subject and not look at the present moment only.").
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). Hamilton's writing in
The Federalist, no doubt, inspired those words:
[W]e must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the present
period, but to look forward to remote futurity.... Nothing, therefore, can be
more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in
the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There
ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may hap-
pen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit
that capacity.
THE FEDERALiSt No. 34, supra note 5, at 204-05 (Alexander Hamilton).
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ability to the necessities of our time is one of its greatest fea-
tures.49 "Not the least characteristic of great statesmanship
which the Framers manifested was the extent to which they did
not attempt to bind the future."50
I While it has the capacity to adapt to changing circum-
stances, however, the Constitution does not leave itself open to
arbitrary application. Justice Johnson, speaking for the Court, in
1821, in Anderson v. Dunn,51 remarked that
[t]he science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if,
indeed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles,
and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the
science of experiment. 2
Fortunately for us, the delegates to the Convention, exercising
sound discretion, supplied us with the fixed principles by which
we are to be governed. While some doubted whether the nation
would survive as one for 150 years,5 3 we have lasted and pros-
pered, under the Constitution, for over 200 years. The Great Ex-
periment is a success. It is no longer an abstract theory. The
constants of the experiment, naturally, cannot be changed, if the
desired result-public and private liberty-is to follow. With the
constants in place, the system will succeed no matter what vari-
ables may arise." Without adherence to those constants, how-
ever, constitutional protections lose all force.""
'1 See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("The genius of our Constitution lies, perhaps as
much as anywhere, in the generality of its principles which makes it susceptible to adap-
tation to the changing times and the needs of the country.").
0 The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 596 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
52 Id. at 226.
' MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 410 (Nathaniel Gorham). The Civil War, of
course, demonstrates that this fear had some basis.
" Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 591 (1895) ("Constitutional provisions do not
change, but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and the
habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation.").
15 Cf. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The genius of our Constitution ... depends ultimately
on the steadfastness with which its basic principles and requirements are observed. Oth-
erwise the critical protections against governmental tyranny [and outside forces] would
quickly become meaningless, as the Government in power could shape it to suit whatever
purposes seem sound at the present"), aff'd sub nam. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
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James Madison, who played a pivotal role in preparing that
"living document" and is often referred to as "the father of our
Constitution," remarked, when a member of the First Congress,
that "[w]e ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye
to the principles upon which it was founded."56 The first rule of
construction in determining what those principles are is that the
Founding Fathers "have intended what they have said. ' 7 That
is, if the plain meaning of the words is clear, we apply the words
to fulfill that meaning. "If, from the imperfection of language,
there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any
given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it
was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the in-
strument itself, should have great influence in the construc-
tion." 58 The preamble sets forth the objects of the government
formed by the provisions that follow it in the Constitution. One
great object is to "provide for the common defence." But, that
object, like the various provisions found elsewhere in the great
document, cannot be read in a vacuum.59 It cannot be severed
from a subsequent clause in the preamble. The government
must "provide for the common defence" to "secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."6 We must be pre-
pared to defend ourselves, as the exigencies of the time demand,
if we are to enjoy the inalienable rights of "Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness."61
Amendments to the constitutional frame of government
should not be made often or without quite compelling reasons.6 2
"a Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128-29 (1926) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 582
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
8 Id. at 188-89. Cf. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) ("A case
may be within the meaning of a statute and not within its letter, and within its letter
and not within its meaning. The intention of the law-maker constitutes the law.").
59 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 44 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The Con-
stitution is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entirety. A particular
provision cannot be dissevered from the rest of the Constitution."); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("[T]he meaning of a statute
is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all parts together and in their rela-
tion to the end in view.").
"0 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
I THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
62 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), Chief Justice Marshall
declared the following-
That the people have an original right to establish for their future government,
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The powers of the federal government were divided carefully
among the three departments so that the goals of the nation,
formed by, and consisting of, the people, could be Qbtained.
Amendments, when made, must be accomplished by the method
prescribed in the Constitution and not by statute or by any
other method. 3
It is not unfair to say that the primary "objective of the
[Constitution is] the protection of the public against internal
and external enemies.""6 Without this protection, we could not
secure the individual liberties that we hold dear. 5 "[We are a
Nation with a duty to survive; a Nation whose Constitution con-
templates war as well as peace; whose government must go for-
ward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no
other."6
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government
of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These
powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the
correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be neces-
sary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of
nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can
wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.
This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible combina-
tions of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of
the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common
defence. 67
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness,
is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has beenerected. The exercise
of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fun-
damental And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can
seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
"Wilson v. State, 217 N.E.2d 147, 150 (Ind. 1966).
65 Cf. MAUsoN's NOTmS, supra note 4, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) ("No Governmt.
could give us tranquility & happiness at home, which did not posess sufficient stability
and strength to make us respectable abroad.").
" United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931). Cf. Hughes, supra note 46,
at 248 ("It has been said that the constitution marches. That is, there are constantly new
applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex situa-
tions, the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and
adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting constitution.").
67 THE FDnEALis" No. 23, supra note 5, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Therefore, the war powers of the federal government are unlim-
ited. That is not to say, though, that they are not separated be-
tween the political branches of the government charged with the
duty to defend the nation from danger emanating from home or
from abroad. "[W]hile the constitutional structure and controls
of our Government are our guides equally in war and in peace,
they must be read with the realistic purposes of the entire in-
strument fully in mind."6 These aims are set forth expressly in
the preamble. Each object, including "provid[ing] for the com-
mon defence," is designed to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity." Powers of the federal government
were divided to secure the blessings of both public and private
liberty.
D: Necessary and Proper
The last of the eighteen clauses in the Constitution that
grant the fundamental legislative power to Congress is the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. It gives Congress power
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.89
Although the first section of Article I places legislative power in
Congress, ° this is the only enumerated grant that confers upon
Congress the power to make laws. Hamilton states that the
clause in Section 8 is "only declaratory of a truth which would
have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication." 1 In a
later paper, Madison explained that, while it follows that "wher-
ever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular
power necessary for doing it is included," the clause was added
to remove "a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions
for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. 1 72
Not only is it "an integral part of each of the preceding 17
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
To "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Id. § 1.
71 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 5, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton).
71 Id. No. 44, supra note 5, at 294 (James Madison).
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clauses, T7a but also it is essential to each power granted to any
branch of the federal government in the Constitution. "There is
not in the whole of that admirable instrument, a grant of powers
which does not -draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to
their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but
auxiliary and subordinate. 74 This characteristic of the Constitu-
tion is one of the great improvements over the Articles of
Confederation.75
The plain language of the Necessary and Proper Clause
grants to Congress the power to make necessary and proper laws
for the functioning of not only its own constitutional role, but
also of any other department or officer of the government of the
United States. The interpretation of this clause by Hamilton
and Madison, to the effect that it is merely redundant, helps to
clarify Article I, Section 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.""0 The word
"herein" must mean "in the Constitution," not only "in Article
I." Nevertheless, the Constitution does not confer upon Con-
gress ."All legislative Powers" but only those therein granted.
Thus, within its sphere of general powers, Congress may only
pass such laws as are necessary and proper "for the carrying into
Execution" the powers enumerated in the first seventeen clauses
of Section 8. It also has power to pass those laws that shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of
the coordinate branches.77
It follows that the Necessary and Proper Clause extends
further than "to the specific objects before enumerated"78 in Ar-
ticle I, Section 8. Congress's plenary power to make laws for the
regulation of the duties and rights of citizens, however, does not
give it license to curtail the powers of the coordinate depart-
ments of government.19 "It is an established principle that the
73 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7' Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225-26 (1821).
7 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDEPATION, art. H ("Each state retains its sovereignty, free-
dom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress asembled.") (em-
phasis added).
" U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
Cf. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D. Mass. 1968) ("Tihe implied
powers may be not only Congressional but sometimes Presidential.").
1 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
11 See, e.g., Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Sere., 634 F.2d 408, 434 (9th
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attainment of a prohibited end may not be accomplished under
the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted."80 Chief
Justice Marshall's famous exposition of the Necessary and
Proper Clause bolsters this principle. "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not-prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional."" If, under the guise of
making law, Congress were to intrude upon the constitutional
authority of the President, the end would not be legitimate or
within the scope of the Constitution; it would be prohibited and
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. It
would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Separation of powers ensures "that neither department may
invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct,
or restrain the action of the other. We are not now speaking of
the merely ministerial duties of officials."'82 In other words, the
Necessary and Proper Clause contemplates some ministerial
overlap among the branches.
When Congress, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
makes "all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution" the powers of another branch, it is acting in a
ministerial capacity, unless discretion otherwise is provided to
Congress in the Constitution or results from separation of pow-
ers. As an example of how the Necessary and Proper Clause
should work, consider the pardon power. Following the Civil
War the Supreme Court held, with respect to the President's
pardon power, that the legislature must make such laws as are
necessary to carry into effect the executive action:
It is true that the section of the act of Congress which purported to
authorize the proclamation of pardon and amnesty by the President
Cir. 1980) (legislative veto case), afl'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
132 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted) ("Congress has plenary authority in all areas
in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that author-
ity does not offend some other constitutional restriction."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 29 (1968) ("But the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the
States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always sub-
ject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific
provisions of the Constitution.").
"' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
82 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
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was repealed .... but this was after the close of the war, when the act
had ceased to be important as an expression of the legislative disposi-.
tion to carry into effect the clemency of the Executive, and after the
decision of this court that the President's power of pardon "is not
subject to legislation"; that "Congress can neither limit the effect of
his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.".....
The repeal of the section in no respect changes the national obliga-
tion, for it does not alter at all the operation of the pardon, or reduce
in any degree the obligations of congress under the Constitution to
give full effect to it, if necessary, by legislation."
This is consistent with the interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause given above. Congress cannot restrict, by legisla-
tion, the constitutional authority of the President. Rather, if
necessary, the legislature must pass laws, including appropria-
tions laws, to give effect to constitutional acts of the executive.
An enumeration of powers is meaningless if a branch of gov-
ernent cannot be confined by the limits imposed.8 As Thomas
Jefferson said, approvingly quoted by Madison,
[a]ll the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same
hands, is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no
alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands,
and not by a single one.s
Therefore, the powers of the federal government were separated,
and Congress's power was limited strictly. Allowing Congress to
usurp the powers of other departments of the federal govern-
ment, by passing laws to that effect, though beyond the scope of
the boundaries of legislative power granted to it, by the people,
by the Constitution, would be to make a mockery of our Consti-
tution and, therefore, of our framework of government and of
our republic. "It would be giving to the legislature a practical
and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to
restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing lim-
aS United States v. Kein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141-42 (1872).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
" THE FEDERALIsT No. 48, supra note 5, at 324 (James Madison). In The Federalist,
Hamilton questioned the purpose of separating "the executive or the judiciary from the
legislative, if both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the
absolute devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal, and
incapable of producing the ends for which it was established." Tas FavEswas No. 71,
supra note 5, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
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its, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure."80
This was not the intent of the Framers. The Necessary and
Proper Clause does not give Congress such control over the coor-
dinate branches.
E. Oath or Affirmation
The final provision preceding the definitional section of the
office of the President imposes the following obligation upon the
Chief Executive:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the fol-
lowing Oath or Affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States."87
This is not the only mention of an oath or affirmation in the
Constitution, but it is the only one for which the content is ex-
pressly set forth." The final clause of the original Constitution,
other than the provision for ratification, demands that
[t]he Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Mem-
bers of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.89
There must be some special significance to the oath assigned to
the President or the Constitution would not have prescribed one
different from that to which all other officers and legisla-
tors-both federal and state-are bound 0
The Framers, to be sure, considered an oath to be a serious
matter. 1 It was believed that an oath, itself, would afford some
88 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S.
1776) (British Parliament "suspend[ed] our own Legislatures, and declare[d] themselves
invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.") (emphasis added).
87 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
8 See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Senators during trial of impeachments); id. amend. IV
("no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation").
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
80 State officers are bound to the same oath because all those officers "will have an
essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 44,
supra note 5, at 297 (James Madison).
9 See, e.g., MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 605-06 ("there could be no danger
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degree of security to the people of their leaders' fidelity.0 2 This
is the essence of the oath to which all officers of the United
States must swear. In Chief Justice Marshall's words, "[tihe
oath which might be exacted-that of fidelity to the constitu-
tion-is prescribed, and no other can be required."9 3 But, the
President's constitutionally worded oath goes beyond mere
fidelity."'
The oath of the President is "a further provision for the ef-
ficacy of the federal powers. ' 95 It "has great significance. " 6 An
earlier draft of the Constitution, as reported by the Committee
of Detail, provided for the following oath:
Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take
the following oath or affirmation, "I - solemnly swear, (or af-
firm) that I will faithfully execute the office of the President of the
United States of America."'
7
Later on, at the Convention, James Madison and his fellow dele-
gate from Virginia, George Mason,
moved to add to the oath to be taken by the supreme Executive "and
will to the best of my judgment and power preserve protect and de-
fend the Constitution of the U.S.""3
that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths.") (Gouverneur Morris).
92 See THE FEDRALsT No. 64, supra note 5, at 422-23 (John Jay).
93 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).
" The clause providing for the President's oath or affirmation is not a collection of
empty words. Marshall said this of the general oath, to support the Constitution, as ap-
plied to the judiciary.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support [the Consti-
tution]? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in
their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be
used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they
swear to support'
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To
prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180. The President also is charged with the sworn duty of preserving,
protecting and defending the Constitution. It would be a "solemn mockery" and "a
crime" if those words were not given their common meaning.
9" See THE FnDEALnr No. 18, supra note 5, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison) ("As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, [the Amphicty-
ons of Ancient Greece] took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 82 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting).
97MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 392.
93 Id. at 536.
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The motion passed.99 The final version, however, does not re-
strict the President's authority as protector of the Constitution
to his judgment and to the means expressly given to him in Sec-
tion 2 of Article II. He is restrained, not by his judgment and,
power, but, as long as his conduct is taken to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution" and does not tend to destroy or to
wage war against it, 100 he is limited only by his personal ability.
All of the power necessary to "preserve, protect and defend" the
Constitution is provided by that instrument. The executive au-
thority set forth in the next section, of Article II, does not con-
tract his sworn duties. Rather, the oath is a guide by which one
may understand better the President's powers defined
thereafter. 101
In the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Clark gave his view,
gleaned from scores of "pronouncements of distinguished mem-
bers" of the Supreme Court, that
the Constitution [grants] to the President extensive authority in times
of grave and imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking,
such a grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the Con-
stitution itself. As Lincoln aptly said, "[i]s it possible to lose the na-
tion and yet preserve the Constitution?"" 2
99 Id.
100 If the President does take action that tends to destroy or to attack the Constitu-
tion, he may be removed for breach of faith. A violation of his oath, a bond between him
and the people, obligating him to pass the Constitution on to his successor as he found
it, would subject him to impeachment. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
"o' Section 3 of Article II concerns the general domestic duties of the Chief Execu-
tive and requires that he "will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States." This is the President's power concerning internal legislation and execution of
those laws. Article II also defines the President's foreign affairs and war powers. These
last two powers, though distinct, sometimes merge and, therefore, are both to be found
in Section 2 of Article II, while the President's domestic authority is given in Section 3.
See Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("[Floreign affairs involve more
than wars, and the President's powers over foreign affairs are not only war powers. As a
matte of fact these are two separate powers in the Constitution. And, as a further
matter of fact, governments have many more dealings with each other and problems
concerning each other in peacetime than they do in wartime. Not only so, but, as we
have already emphasized, the duty of the President to prevent war is as important as is
his power to conduct one.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959). Cf.
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The Constitution in
Article II, § 2 confers broad powers upon the President in the conduct of relations with
foreign states and in the conduct of the national defense."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972).
102 343 U.S. 579, 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
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If the President, acting to the best of his ability, takes measures
designed to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation, which is
inseparable from the Constitution, he acts, not only in conform-
ity with the Constitution, but also according to his most solemn
duty.
H. THE EXEcuTIVE
A. Qualities Of The Office Of President
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the British Constitu-
tion, described the three categories of the king's substantive
prerogatives-
first, the king's royal character;, secondly, his royal authority, and,
lastly, his royal income. These are necessary to secure reverence to his
person, obedience to his commands, and an affluent supply for the
ordinary expenses of government; without all of which it is impossible
to maintain the executive power in due independence and vigor. Yet,
in every branch of this large and extensive dominion, our free consti-
tution has interposed such reasonable checks and restrictions, as may
curb it from trampling on those liberties which it was meant to secure
and establish.0 3
With respect to each of these categories, the President is
like the British king only to the extent necessary to protect pub-
lie liberty. For the reasons that compelled the thirteen colonies
to declare their independence from Great Britain, however, the
office of the President otherwise is unlike the example of the
British monarch in each of these categories.
The Framers endeavored to place independence and vigor in
the office of the President, as it resided with the British king.
The intent of the Founding Fathers, however, was to accomplish
this goal without infusing the office of the Chief Executive with
the attributes of a monarchy. While the delegates to the Phila-
delphia Convention were fearful of the tyranny of an omnipo-
tent legislature, they equally were opposed to the establishment
of a monarchy.10 4
103 1 WILL BLAcKsroNE, CoimiENTAUEs *240.
104 Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, no doubt was fearful of the potential
abridgement of individual liberties by the President when, early on at the Convention,
he stated that he "was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the-Executive powers of
the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c., which would render the Execu-
tive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one." MADSON's Noves, supra note
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The Confederate Congress, by virtue of the Articles of Con-
federation, in theory possessed the chief powers of the king. The
problem with the confederation was not the authority conferred
upon the Congress but, rather, the want of independence from
the states to act on their behalf and of vigor to act effectively.
For that reason, the Confederate Congress, standing on its own,
was not dangerous to individual liberties of citizens and of states
but threatened the very existence of the states and of their in-
habitants by its lack of real power to protect them from invasion
or from insurrection. 10
5
Thus, the task for the Founding Fathers was to redistribute
the powers of the Confederate Congress to provide for both pub-
lic and private safety.
The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and
finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the
existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed
change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effec-
tual mode of administering them.106
The challenge for the Framers was to form a system of govern-
ment that to enforce public rights, would include a strong execu-
tive, but that also would protect individual liberties.
1. Independence and Vigor
There must be energy in the executive for him to fulfill his
duties of preserving the nation, by representing the United
States in foreign affairs, of protecting and defending the Union
from internal and external dangers, by commanding the armed
forces, and of taking care that the laws are executed faithfully.
To remedy the weakness of the Confederate Congress and to
provide for a strong arm of the government capable of defending
the United States from any threat to its existence or to the pub-
4, at 45. Equally clear, however, is that the fear that he articulated concerned the powers
to be conferred upon the President and not the character of the office. In fact, immedi-
ately after speaking these words, he seconded James Wilson's motion to establish an
executive consisting of one person. Id.
'05 Cf. MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 128 (Edmund Randolph) ("We must re-
sort therefor to a National Legislation over individuals, for which Congs. are unfit. To
vest such power in them, would be blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary
to the recd. maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs. has
been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.").
100 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 5, at 303 (James Madison).
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lic safety, the Framers established a vigorous executive
department."0 7
As pointed out above, the powers of the federal government
were separated to secure best the objects of public and of private
liberty.108 It is precisely in those matters that are critical to the
safety of the general public that the President must be given the
highest degree of discretion to act, to the best of his ability, fear-
lessly and without restraint.109 For the good of the whole, "it is
certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to
dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.1 120 The
Framers "relied on the vigor of the Executive as a great security
for the public liberties."111 In defining vigor as "energy," Hamil-
ton listed its components as "first, unity; secondly, duration;
thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, compe-
tent powers." 1 2
"I See THE FEDERAL=ST No. 70, supra note 5, at 454 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Energy
in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essen-
tial to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to
the steady administration of the laws .... "); id. No. 37, at 227 (James Madison)
("[e]nergy in government is essential to that security against external and internal dan-
ger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very
definition of good government"). See also The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.. 579, 682
(1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) ("It is apparent that the Presidency vas deliberately
fashioned as an office of power and independence. Of course, the Framers created no
autocrat capable of arrogating any power unto himself at any time. But neither did they
create an automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the
survival of the Republic itself may be at stake."); Myers v. United States, 272 US. 52,
116-17 (1926) ("The debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an intention to
create a strong Executive ... and many of his important functions were specified so as to
avoid the humiliating weakness of the Congress during the Revolution and under the
Articles of Confederation.").
103 See notes 17-36 and accompanying text supra.
,01 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 (1982).
110 THE FEDERALisT No. 71, supra note 5, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
. MADnSoN's NoTES, supra note 4, at 334 (Rufus King). On the other hand, the
Founding Fathers relied "on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of their
Rights & interests." Id. at 338 (Elbridge Gerry).
1I THE FEDERALiST No. 70, supra note 5, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton). The Consti-
tution provides for duration. The President holds office for a term of four years, U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1, cL 1, and may be reelected. (The propriety (or, in my opinion, impro-
priety) of the Twenty-Second Amendment, which provides that no one may serve as
president more than twice, need not be discussed here.)
Adequate provision for the support of the executive also may be found in the Con-
stitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. See THE FEDnALL No. 73, supra, at 474-76
(Alexander Hamilton).
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2. Unity
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
described the authority of the king of Great Britain:
[T]he executive part of government.., is wisely placed in a single
hand by the British constitution, for the sake of unanimity, strength
and dispatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be subject to
many wills: many wills, if disunited and drawing different ways, create
weakness in a government; and to unite those several wills, and reduce
them to one, is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of
state will afford. The king of England is therefore not only the chief,
but properly the sole, magistrate of the nation, all others acting by
commission from, and in due subordination to him .... " I'
The Framers believed that, if the executive powers were not
vested in a single person, the federal government would be
sapped of the vigor necessary to defend public rights. Of all the
powers of the President, however, the commander-in-chief
power would suffer most from such decentralization. In The
Federalist, Hamilton wrote that,
[olf all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of
power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of
the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the
common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of
the executive authority.114
Thus, unity in the office of the President provides safety to the
general public.
The Framers transformed the attributes of the king of
Great Britain into checks upon potential presidential tyranny.
While unity in the presidency is essential to the preservation
and protection of public safety, consistent with republicanism,
the Founding Fathers framed the Constitution with another,
"'l 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *250.
114 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 5, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added). See also id. No. 70, supra note 5, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) ("In the conduct
of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security,
every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.").
At the Convention, similar concerns over plurality in the executive were expressed.
See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note.4, at 58-59 (Pierce Butler); id. at 60 (Elbridge Gerry)
("It wd. be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters,
whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three
heads.").
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equally important, derivative object in mind-individual liberty.
The Framers recognized that, because unity ensures accountabil-
ity, unity in the executive department also is the best check
upon possible usurpations of power by the President. James
Madison reflected the substance of these thoughts, as expressed
at the Convention:
Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of being the
fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He
repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was
inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was
so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great con-
federated Republic would do for it."15
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention agreed that the
greatest check upon the President's ability to usurp ultra vires
powers is that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America. ' 112 Unity "constitute[s]
safety in the republican sense" by requiring "first, a due depen-
dence on the people; secondly, a due responsibility."117
3. Responsibility
The President, as the sole person assigned the duties to take
care that the laws of the United States are executed faithfully
and to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation, is given awe-
some responsibility.118 But, responsibility is a two-way street.
The Constitution gives the President a great deal of open road
and sets forth a map defining his terrain, but, as he is the only
vehicle out there, with everyone watching, every violation will be
spotted. His license is subject to renewal after four years and
may be revoked, anywhere along the road, for gross violations."'
11 MADISON'S NoTFs, supra note 4, at 47.
118 U.S. CONsT. art. J, § 1, cL 1 (emphasis added).
117 THE FEDERALIsT No. 70, supra note 5, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton). See also id.
No. 77, supra note 5, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton).
118 The Constitution, in Article H, when granting powers to the executive depart-
ment, fully vests the President, alone, with all executive power. It uses the words "The
President" or "He." While the Constitution provides for the appointment and use of
executive advisors and agents, executive power resides solely with the President.
11' Plurality in the executive makes detection, of both the author of unwise policy
and of misconduct, more difficult. Thus, as Hamilton wrote,
the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest
securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first,
the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of
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These vital checks on potential abuse of power can be found
in the first and final sections of Article II. The first clause of
Article II, Section 1, reads:
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years.
In the same clause that gives the executive power strength
through centralization in one person, that person is made re-
sponsible to the people for his actions-he holds office for only
four years subject to reelection. The last section of Article II,
clearly directed by its placement within that article most signifi-
cantly at the President, is the Constitution's provision for
impeachment:
The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Convic-
tion of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.""
The strength and independence of the executive depart-
ment will preserve and protect the United States. Unity in the
executive also guards personal rights, by making the President
accountable. "Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal
properties reqd. in the Executive. Important as these are, that of
responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by leav-
ing it singly to discharge its functions." '121
For the United States to play a responsible role in the inter-
national arena, it was necessary to give the President great dis-
cretion in foreign affairs and in war.122 It is essential that the
nation speak with one voice. That voice also must have force to
back the words lest words alone not be effective. Therefore, both
powers reside with the one President of the nation; "[t]he re-
sponsibility [to the nation] must be where the power is.'1 23
the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on
account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the oppor-
tunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons
they trust, in order either to their removal from office, or to their actual pun-
ishment in cases which admit of it.
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 5, at 460-61 (Alexander Hamilton).
120 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
21 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 81 (John Dickinson).
122 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'1 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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Wisely, the Constitution places that responsibility in the execu-
tive and makes the holder answerable directly to the electo-
rate,124 who can publicly censure the President by failing to re-
elect him. Accordingly, the President should be left alone to
discharge his duties, so as not to dilute his accountability. 120
If, once elected, a President acts "to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution," the people, though they may disagree
with his methods, have no constitutional method of disarming
him of power until the next election. The people, having chosen
the President, must accept responsibility for his decisions and
actions.
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion in the Steel
Seizure Case,12 6 wrote the following:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head
in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of
public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his
decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the
public eye and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to
compete with him in access to public mind through modern methods
of communications. By his prestige as head of state and his influence
upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed
to check and balance his power which often cancels their
effectiveness.12 7
While it is true that the President is more visible today than in
the past because of advances in mass communication, that does
not create an overbalance of executive power dangerous to re-
publican liberty. The degree of accountability to the people, as
12 Worthy v. Hester, 270 F.2d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("the Constitution has
wisely placed that burden in the hands of one who must justify his decisions before the
electorate").
I" In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), the
Court quoted an 1816 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which concluded that
the President,
[f]or his conduct. . . is responsible to the Constitution. The committee con-
sider[s] this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his
duty.... They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of for-
eign negotiations [is calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby
to impair the best security for the national safety.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106,
110 (2d Cir.) (foreign affairs power), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966); Velvel v. Johnson,
287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968) (commander-in-chief power), af'd, 415 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
6 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
127 Id. at 653-54.
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he is one person constantly in the public eye, has grown in direct
proportion to his power. The improved technology of our era has
increased his power in terms of his capability to fulfill his duty
to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation. Unfortunately,
outside forces also have become more threatening to public lib-
erty due to advanced technology. The President's power is only,
and always should be, commensurate with the danger imposed.
Technology by increasing accountability, has made private lib-
erty more secure.
Responsibility diminishes in direct proportion to an in-
crease in numbers. Under the system devised by the Framers, if
the President were left to carry out his executive functions with-
out a meddlesome legislature and without a behemoth bureau-
cracy, the President would be accountable for his actions; then,
the people would benefit from a more effective bulwark against
usurpations of power by the President while enjoying the bene-
fits of public liberty.
In closing this discussion of presidential attributes, Chief
Justice Hughes provided me (inadvertently I am sure) with a fe-
licitous summation. Not eager to do any unnecessary work, I
shall use it:
It was not in the contemplation of the constitution that the command
of forces and the conduct of campaigns should be in charge of a coun-
cil or that as to this there should be division of authority or responsi-
bility. The prosecution of war demands in the highest degree the
promptness, directness and unity of action in military operations
which alone can proceed from the Executive. This exclusive power to
command the army and navy and thus to direct and control cam-
paigns exhibits not auto6racy, but democracy fighting effectively
through its chosen instruments and in accordance with the established
organic law.129
The next question should be: What is the executive war power?
B. The Commander-in-Chief Power
Justice Frankfurter once said: "The war power is the war
power. ' 129 This fine explanation apparently did not help Justice
Jackson who, four years later, expressed puzzlement over the
meaning of the constitutional provision granting the President
12 Hughes, supra note 46, at 233.
129 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948).
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the commander-in-chief power:
These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent
controversies in our constitutional history. Of course, they imply
something more than an empty title. But just what authority goes
with the name has plagued presidential advisers who would not waive
or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends. It
undoubtedly puts the Nation's armed forces under presidential com-
mand. Hence, this loose appellation is sometimes advanced as support
for any presidential action, internal or external, involving use of force,
the idea being that it vests power to do anything, anywhere, that can
be done with an army or navy."'
One can understand where a constitutional power "begins or
ends" only, first, by comprehending the object of the grant and,
second, by scrutinizing it in the context of related grants of, or
limitations on, power found in the Constitution.""' The object of
the grant is to "provide for the common defence."' 32 The Consti-
tution, however, is replete with grants of power that, together,
serve this object. Therefore, the contours of the commander-in-
chief power will be found only by fitting it into the constitu-
tional puzzle that, when complete, forms the full panoply of war
powers.
To better understand the separation of war powers among
the branches of the federal government, one should refer once
again to Blackstone for an explanation of the British monarch's
war powers at the time the Constitution of the United States
was drafted. In his Commentaries, Blackstone wrote the
following:
The king is considered.., as the generalissimo, or the first in military
command, within the kingdom. The great end of society is to protect
the weakness of individuals by the united strength of the community.
,30 The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 641-42 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
131 Cf. Ex Parte iligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, CJ., concurring):
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to
declare war. It has, therefore, the power to prouide by law for carrying on war.
This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of
war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the
forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the
President as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are derived from the
Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent must be
determined by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions.
(emphasis added).
1' See notes 40, 67 and accompanying text supra.
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and the principal use of government is to direct that united strength
in the best and most effectual manner to answer the end proposed.
Monarchical government is allowed to be the fittest of any for this
purpose: it follows therefore, from the very end of its institution, that
in a monarchy the military power must be trusted in the hands of the
prince. 
1 3
Our Founding Fathers accepted the idea that unity of the states
and in the federal executive is essential for vigor, which is neces-
sary for a strong defense. Our nation, though, is founded upon
republican principles. To this end, the federal government was
arranged so that, in external matters, the United States speak
and act as one, while, in relation to internal concerns, they and
their inhabitants may be divided. In The Federalist, Hamilton
cites Montesquieu approvingly:
"It is very probable" (says he) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution thathas all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force
of a monarchical, government. I mean a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC."s3'
The king of Great Britain possessed many more war-related
powers than the power to direct military forces. 135 These include
powers that our Constitution vests in Congress. Prior to the
Constitution, the Confederate Congress, as the sole department
of the confederate government, had powers that now are distrib-
uted among the three branches of the federal government, in-
cluding the power to direct the operations of the armed forces of
the United States."'8 Even before the Articles of Confederation
had been ratified,
Congress raised armies, fitted out a navy, and prescribed rules for
their government: Congress conducted all military operations both by
land and sea: Congress emitted bills of credit, received and sent am-
bassadors, and made treaties: Congress commissioned privateers to
cruise against the enemy, directed what vessels should be liable to
133 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262 (emphasis added).
" THE FEDERALIST No. 9, supra note 5, at 50 (Alexander Hamilton) (footnote omit.
ted). See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 30, at 183. Cf. MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 197
(James Wilson) ("[elvery nation may be regarded in two relations I. to its own citizens.
2. To foreign nations").
:35 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262-66, *407-21.
238 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
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capture, and prescribed rules for the distribution of prizes.1"
To wage the Revolutionary War successfully, the Continental
Congress "appointed a commander in chief." 38 Under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the Confederate Congress retained the
power appoint a commander-in-chief but was forbidden to do so
without the assent of nine states."9 Thus, military command
was fragmented. The commander-in-chief- was answerable to the
Congress, which, in turn, depended upon the states. To remedy
the weakness of this division of authority in the conduct of war,
the Constitution places this power entirely in the hands of the
President. For the public safety, "[t]he two correlative powers,
to conduct war and to prevent war, are Executive functions
under our Constitution." 140 For the purpose of republican safety,
many of the powers of the king and of the Confederate Congress
were vested in the federal legislature. 141
Therefore, the President's power in war, while, of neces-
sity,14 2 great, does not approach that of the British monarch.
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally
the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance
much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the su-
13 Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 54, 80 (1795).
118 Id. at 111. The commander-in-chief was General Washington.
129 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, par. 6:
The united states in congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant
letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or
alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the
sums and expences necessary for the defence and welfare of the united states,
or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the united
states, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the numbers of vesels of var,
to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor
appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine states assent to
the same: nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from
day to day be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the united states
in congress assembled.
140 Worthy v. Hester, 270 F.2d 905, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"I See, e.g., THE FEDERIST No. 49, supra note 5, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison) (lawmakers "are more immediately the confidential guardians of the
rights and liberties of the people"); id. No. 70, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Congress is
"best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges
and interests"). See also notes 5, 111 supra.
12 See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Pres-
ident "is made ... from necessity, and the nature of his duties, the commander-in-chief
of the army and navy").
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preme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as
first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British
king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating
of fleets and armies,-all which, by the Constitution under considera-
tion, would appertain to the legislature.
14s
As explained below, the powers of raising, supporting, and
regulating armed forces are checks on the President's power to
"protect and defend" public liberty, fashioned to protect liberty
in the republican sense."" These legislative powers, however, do
not restrict the Commander-in-Chief's discretion in employing
and in directing the armed forces as he deems necessary against
foreign aggressors (or against domestic rebels). The authority to
declare war, which includes the publicly authorized, private war
power, aimed at securing personal liberty,145 is the power' of con-
ferring certain rights and of imposing specific obligations upon
the individual citizens of the United States. It does not contract
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
i Commander-in-Chief Of Armed Forces Of The United
States
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, invests
the President with the commander-in-chief power:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opin-
ion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive De-
partments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
There is no qualification on the President's command of the
armed forces of the United States., The distinction between that
power and the President's command over the states' militia is
apparent from the language of the Constitution. The President
is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United
States at all times.1 46 There need not be a war or public danger.
11- THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 5, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (footnote
omitted).
See notes 208-75 and accompanying text infra.
1 See notes 384-442 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893) ("President is always
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"The Constitution in some of its provisions expressly refers to
'time of peace' and 'time of war.' "1 7 This is not among them.
Once a branch of the armed services is raised or is provided, the
President is its commander-in-chief.
It is certain that the Framers intended, by vesting the com-
mander-in-chief power in the President, to give him the author-
ity to conduct war.1 8 Conducting war includes the power to di-
rect the movements of the armed forces and to employ them as
the President determines to be necessary for the security of the
United States.
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength;
and the power of directing and employing the common strength,
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive
authority.14 9
Chief Justice Taney, in Fleming v. Page,50 reiterated this expo-
sition of the power of the President to conduct war:
As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of
the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass
and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile coun-
try, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United
States.""
the commander in chief"), aff'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
147 United States v. Rappeport, 36 F. Supp. 915, 916 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd sub nor.
United States v. Herling, 120 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1941). See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cL. 3
(various prohibitions on states); id. amend. HI (quartering of soldiers); id. amend. V
(grand jury indictment).
"' An earlier draft of the Constitution gave Congress the power to make war. See
notes 423-35 and accompanying text infra. The word "make" was changed to "declare,"
as it presently stands. The final vote, of the nine states voting, on the motion to change
this language, was eight in favor and one against. Originally, there were two against, but,
[o]n the remark of Mr. King that "make" war might be understood to "con-
duct" it which was an Executive function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection,
and the vote of Cont. was changed to-ay.
MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 476 n.*. Cf. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 2,
139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) ("Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns
14 THE FEDERALiST No. 74, supra note 5, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added).
1.0 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
"I Id. at 615 (emphasis added). Accord Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32 (1st
Cir. 1971) (power as Commander-in-Chief to station forces abroad); United States v.
Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 316 (C.M.A. 1979) (Commander-in-Chief has power "to deploy troops
and assign duties as he deems necessary"); Hughes, supra note 46, at 238 ('"There is no
limitation upon the authority of Congress to create an army and it is for the president as
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Again, the President has a sworn duty to "preserve, protect and
defend" the nation. 152 He cannot take office until he takes an
oath that he will do so to the best of his ability. If there were a
danger threatening the existence or welfare of the United States,
the President would be duty-bound to take action to stanch its
advancement and to protect the Union.
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initi-
ate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for
any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a
foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a
war, although the declaration of it be "unilateral."'15
3
Once there is a show of force that the President determines to
be a threat to the nation, the President is bound to meet the
force with force. War exists from the unilateral action of the
hostile enemy.154 As Commander-in-Chief, the President is re-
sponsible fully for the conduct of, war.
Incident to the President's duty to conduct war is his power
to prevent an invasion before it takes place. Justice Story wrote:
[T]he power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power to
provide against the attempt and danger of invasion, as the necessary
and proper means to effectuate the object. One of the best means to
repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action before the
invader himself has reached the soil."05
Further support for this assertion may be found in the Con-
stitution itself, by looking at the whole document. Article I, Sec-
Commander-in-Chief to direct the campaigns of that army wherever he may think they
should be carried on.").
162 See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
161 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
164 See notes 383, 401 and accompanying text infra. Because:
[A]ccording to the law of nature there should be a mutual performance of the
duties of peace, whoever takes the first step in violating them against me, has,
so far as he is able, freed me from my performance of the duties of peace, and
therefore, in confessing that he is my enemy, he allows me a license to use
force against him to any degree, or so far as I may think desirable.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1298 (James B. Scott ed., C.H.
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Claredon Press 1934). "War may also begin properly
upon the denial of a demand, which in my opinion does not differ from actual force."
CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 19 (James B. Scott ed., Tenney
Frank trans., Clarendon Press 1930).
166 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827).
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tion 8, Clause 15, of the Constitution, empowers Congress
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.
Later, in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution provides as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger .... 100
The limitation upon the President's use of the militia is, for the
protection of individual and of states' rights, much stricter than
the limitation upon the President's use of the armed forces.15 7
The President always is in command of the armed forces. He
commands the militia only when called into actual service of the
United States. Nevertheless, even the limitation on the Presi-
dent's use of the states' militia is not quite as restrictive as that
imposed upon the states themselves. The Constitution states
that "[n]o state shall . ..engage in War, unless actually in-
vaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of de-
lay. '158 Because this language, borrowed from Article VI of the
Articles of Confederation, is used as applied to the states but
not as applied to the federal use of the states' militia, the limita-
tions on the powers differ in degrees. If the states must wait un-
til actually invaded or until the states are in such imminent dan-
ger of being invaded as will not admit of delay, the federal
government need not wait until such an emergency exists.
This distinction rests upon the different principles that ap-
ply to private and to public self-defense powers. 5 9 The language
158 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
157 See notes 235-36 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) ("although the militia, when in actual ser-
vice, is under his command, yet the appointment of the officers is reserved to the states,
as a security against the use of the military power for purposes dangerous to the liberties
of the people, or the rights of the states").
1 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
59 Cf. HUGo GRoTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF VAR AND PEACE INCLUDING THE LAW OF NA-
TURE AND OF NATIONS 76 (Archibald C. Campbell, trans., Hyperion reprint ed. 1979)
("when our lives are threatened with immediate danger, it is lawful to kill the aggressor,
if the danger cannot otherwise be avoided: an instance, as it has been shewn, on which
the justice of private war rests") (emphasis added); PUFENDOR, supra note 154, at 1299
("citizens are allowed to use violence in their own defence only in case of an unavoidable
peril"). In this Article, principally in the final section, see notes 359-442 and accompany-
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of the Constitution that describes Congress's power to call forth
the militia-before placing the militia under the President's
command to be employed, as he deems necessary, for the public
safety-does not use the same restrictive language that applies
to the states. Public danger is not "imminent danger." If the
President can employ the militia in times of public danger, not
amounting to imminent danger, and to repel invasions, without
waiting until actually invaded, then the President must be able
to deploy federal armed forces to prevent a potential threat to
the security of the United States from approaching the magni-
tude of "imminent danger" or of an actual invasion.
[Pirivate war extends only to self-defence, whereas sovereign powers
have a right not only to avert, but to punish wrongs. From whence
they are authorised to prevent a remote as well as an immediate
aggression.160
This right and power of public self-defense, which includes col-
lective self-defense of a community of nations,161 requires no
declaration of war.162 Under the Constitution, it is the duty of
the President to "protect and defend" the nation.
The powers of Congress are enumerated expressly. Con-
versely, the President's power is defined but not enumerated: It
extends as far as the exigency of the moment dictates. Moreover,
Congress must make those laws that are necessary and proper to
carry into effect the direction of a war by the Commander-in-
Chief. Therefore, Congress may make far-reaching laws, in sup-
ing text infra, I will refer to Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, and Vattel, all of whom,
at the time of the Constitutional Convention, were recognized as authorities on war and
peace and on the law of nations. Grotius was cited by Blackstone as the principal author-
ity on rights of war, see text accompanying note 396 infra, and was cited in The Federal-
ist No. 20, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) and The Federalist No. 84, at
563 (Alexander Hamilton). A record exists also of Vattel being cited during the Conven-
tion. See MADISON's NoTES, supra note 4, at 202 (Luther Martin). According to Justice
Story, each of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek is good authority, with Bynkershoek
"the highest authority." Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 140 (1814)
(Story, J., dissenting). Vattel, said Story, is less reliable. Id. at 140-41.
16o GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 83 (emphasis added).
161 See note 403 and accompanying text infra. See also United States v. Mitchell,
246 F. Supp. 874, 898 (D. Conn. 1965) ("Unquestionably the President can start the gun
at home or abroad to meet force with force; he is not only authorized but bound to do so.
And under our established concept of international dependence and foreign commit-
ments, this power must extend to repelling -attacks upon our allies which threaten our
own security.") (citation omitted).
162 See note 401 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 57:1083
WAR POWERS
port of the military campaign, if the President deems such mea-
sures necessary, but cannot impair the authority of the Com-
mander-in-Chief. 163 Such appropriate means are incidental to
the powers of the President.
I The President's public war power includes the authority to
defend the nation and permits punishment of aggression and the
prevention of future conflict.164 This authority also comprehends
collective self-defense.6 5 The power to declare war clearly is not
a defense power.166 The legislative authorities essential to the
common defense are the powers to raise and support armies, to
provide and maintain a navy, and to prescribe rules for their
government and regulation.16 7 The defense power, once armed
forces are provided, resides with the President (except with re-
spect to prescribing rules for the government and regulation of
the forces). Congress may not intrude upon the President's
power to "protect and defend" the nation, which includes the
power to punish aggression.
There is no constitutional limitation or check on the com-
mander-in-chief power, once Congress provides manpower and
money, other than that it extends only so far as its object: The
power must be exercised to "preserve, protect and defend" the
nation."68 Nonetheless, the people (as the electorate) and Con-
"' The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute
in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers.
Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise. But neither can the
President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of
Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President.
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring). Cf. Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) (President's commander-in-chief power cannot
be fettered); Street v. United States, 24 Ct. CL 230, 247 (1889) (Framers put "power of
command and control.., in the hands of the President, with only two restrictions set
upon it- that Congress should have power 'to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces'; that the appointment of officers should be 'by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.' "), aff'd, 133 U.S. 299 (1890).
'" See Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1870) (power to carry on war
"carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the con-
flict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress"). See also
BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 118-19 ("[T]he right of self-defence.... permits us, as
does every declaration of war, to injure the enemy in every possible manner, that is, not
only to avert the peril with which the enemy threatens us, but also to strip him of all his
goods.").
"' See note 403 and accompanying text infra.
'c' See note 206 and accompanying text infra.
167 See note 206 and accompanying text infra.
" Contrast this with the President's foreign affairs powers, which themselves are
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gress (possessing the impeachment power) have some authority
to ensure that the President stays within these bounds, as well
as within the bounds of his foreign affairs power.
The commander-in-chief power, indeed, necessarily, is very
broad. Its purpose is to protect public liberty. The contours of
this authority may be defined only by an understanding of the
powers vested in the legislature to guard against oppression by
the executive of the people and of the states.16 9 Together, the
President's war and foreign affairs powers equip him with the
necessary authority to make peace and to keep the peace. One
method of accomplishing this is diplomacy-another is war.
2. The Question of a Council
On August 18, 1787, at the Philadelphia Convention, Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut
observed that a Council had not yet been provided for the President.
He conceived there ought to be one. His proposition was that it
should be composed of the President of the Senate-the Chief-Jus-
tice, and the ministers as they might be estabd. for the departments
of foreign & domestic affairs, war finance and marine, who should ad-
vise but not conclude the President.17 0
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, in response, stated that
"the President shd. be authorized to call for advice or not as he
might chuse. Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a
weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction."171
The question of whether the Constitution should provide for an
executive council was debated heatedly by the delegates. The
difference of opinion on the matter was divided roughly along
the lines of argument first articulated by Ellsworth and by
Pinckney.
nearly exclusive. The war powers of the President, to be clear, are those powers exercised
as Commander-in-Chief. The Senate, to the exclusion of the House, however, has consti-
tutional powers to restrain the exercise of the President's foreign affairs power. It must
ratify treaties and nominations of ambassadors, of other public ministers and consuls, of
judges, and of other principal officers of the United States whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for in the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
"Accordingly, I shall review these powers of Congress to complete the understand-
ing of the commander-in-chief authority. See notes 206-442 and accompanying text
infra.
:70 MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 481.
171 Id.
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The notion of an executive council can be traced to the
British Constitution. The king had, at his disposal, four councils,
"[b]ut the principal council belonging to the king is his privy
council, which is generally called, by way of eminence, the coun-
cil."'72 Privy. counsellors were appointed by nomination of the
king, "and, on taking the necessary oaths, they become immedi-
ately privy counsellors during the life of the king that chooses
them, but subject to removal at his discretion."173 "The duty of
a privy counsellor appears from the oath of office,' 11 4 just as the
President's oath imposes obligations upon him.
Unlike our republican system, in which the President is im-
peachable for a breach of the public faith,17 under the British
Constitution, the king was not subject to the laws but, rather,
was assigned the attribute of absolute perfection. 7 0 Therefore,
to redress public wrongs, privy council members were made
amenable to impeachment:
For as the king cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil
counsellors, and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be
examined and punished. The constitution has therefore provided, by
means of indictments, and parliamentary impeachments, that no man
shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land.
But it is at the same time a maxim in those laws, that the king him-
self can do no wrong: since it would be a great weakness and absurdity
in any system of positive law, to define any possible wrong, without
any possible redress.177
In the United States, the President is both subject to the will of
the people, at the election polls, and subject to impeachment for
gross violations of the public trust. In contrast, it was the law
under the British Constitution
that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not
to be imputed to the king, nor is he answerable for it personally to his
people: for this doctrine would totally destroy that constitutional in-
172 1 WLLu.i BLAcKsToNE, CozmNT s *229.
173 1 id. at *230.
174 1 id.
175 E.g., THE FEDERALisT No. 65, supra note 5, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (im-
peachment is for "abuse or violation of some public trust").
176 1 WILLIAi BLAcKSToNz, CobsiENTrRims *246.
7 1 id. at *244. See also id. at *251-52 ("In the exertion... of these prerogatives,
which the law has given him, the king is irresistible and absolute .... And yet, if the
consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonor of the lingdom,
the parliament will call his advisers to a just and severe account.").
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dependence of the crown, which is necessary for the balance of power,
in our free and active, and therefore compounded, constitution.1 78
In our Constitution, the independence of the President was
established by vesting all executive power in him alone. Unity in
the executivel" is essential in our system, however, not only to
equip it with the requisite independence, vigor, dispatch, and se-
crecy, but also to hold the President himself accountable for the
actions of the executive department. In this way, the President
can provide for public safety while individual liberty remains
secure.
On August 20, 1787, Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania,
moved to submit to the Committee of Detail, for its considera-
tion, a proposed provision for the establishment of an executive
council.180 On August 22, 1787, the report of the Committee of
Detail was read."'1 It included a clause establishing an executive
council:
The President of the United States shall have a privy council, which
shall consist of the president of the senate [the Vice-President], the
speaker of the house of representatives, the chief justice of the su-
preme court, and the principal officer in the respective departments of
foreign affairs, domestic affairs, war, marine, and finance, as such de-
partments of office shall from time to time be established, whose duty
it shall be to advise him in matters respecting the execution of his
office, which he shall think proper to lay before them: but their advice
shall not conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures
which he shall adopt.
1 82
Later, a Committee of Eleven reported to the Convention some
of its proposed amendments. 8 3 Among them was the insertion,
after the words "He shall be commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual service of the U.S.,""," of the
clause "and may require the opinion in writing of the principal
officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject
178 1 id. at *246.
179 See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra.
18o MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 487-88.
82 Id. at 509.
182 Id. at 509-10.
183 Id. at 573. The delegates formed the Committee of Eleven to consider the pro-
posed amendments.
18, Id. at 535.
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relating to the duties of their respective offices."' 8 This recom-
mendation eliminated the establishment of an executive council
but adopted some of the language employed in Morris's propo-
sal.186 It, like the proposed amendment offered by Gouverneur
Morris, provided that the President may require opinions in
writing. However, it rejected the notion of constitutionally man-
dated consultation by the President with members of the coordi-
nate departments of the federal government. By eradicating the
suggested privy council clause, which was to include the Chief
Justice of the United States and the Speaker of the House, the
proposal of the Committee of Eleven emphatically denied the
coordinate branches of government a consultation role in execu-
tive decision making. It is evident that the Committee of Eleven
exhibited a concern for preserving "the principle[s] of executive
responsibility and separation of the powers, sought for by the
framers of our Government," in rejecting the notion of an execu-
tive council. 8 7 Further, this amendment has the effect of limit-
ing the responsibility of an advisor and his accountability for
recommendations to the President alone,188 leaving the Presi-
dent solely responsible and accountable to his country.'8
Gouverneur Morris, who had proposed that a privy council
be instituted by the Constitution, explained why his proposal
was rejected:
The question of a Council was considered in the Committee, where it
was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his Council, to concur in
his wrong measures, would acquire their protection for them."0
The idea of providing a privy council for the executive was re-
jected, because it would have diminished that accountability of
the President deemed essential to the security of personal
85 Id. at 575.
188 See id. at 488 (Gouverneur Morris) ('The President may from time to time sub-
mit any matter to the discussion of the Council of State, and he may require the written
opinions of any one or more of the members ....").
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 167 (1926).
18 Cf. note 118 supra.
189 While the Committee of Detail's proposed clause, providing for a privy council,
expressly stated that the advice of the committee would not "affect [the President's]
responsibility for the measures which he shall adopt," see note 182 and accompanying
text supra, such parchment protection would not serve as a practical safeguard of per-
sonal or state liberty.
190 MADIsoN's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 601. The Committee's amendment was passed
in the affirmative, with one dissent. Id. at 602.
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liberty.
In The Federalist, Hamilton, after discussing the need for
one executive in whom all executive power resides, asserts that
the reasoning, upon which the establishment of the presidency
in one man is based, applies,
though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a
council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the
operations of the ostensible Executive..
"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in
their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution
on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand,
whether true or false. 191
Therefore, the President was left fully accountable for all execu-
tive actions."9 2 In the performance of his constitutional func-
tions, the President may require opinions from the principal of-
ficers of the executive departments. If he does, the Constitution
suggests the opinion ought to be offered in writing.193 Of course,
"' THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 5, at 459-60 (Alexander Hamilton) (footnote
omitted).
192 The federal courts should not review executive decision making. Cf. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. at 170-71:
The province of the court is, solely to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion.
Where the head of a department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is
to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again
repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his con-
duct, would be rejected without hesitation.
(emphasis added).
191 James Iredell, later a member of the first Supreme Court, wrote in response to
George Mason's objections to the Constitution that the opinions the President may re-
quire from the principal officers of the executive departments are "to be given with the
utmost solemnity in writing." James Iredell, Observations on George Mason's Objections
to the Federal Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 333, 348 (Paul L. Ford
ed., Da Capo Press 1968) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS]. These written opinions will provide
the President with an opinion, memorialized in writing, to which he may refer, and
which he may consider thoughtfully without confusing the advice that was given.
From those written reasons, weighed with care, surely the President can form
as good a judgment, as if they had been given by a dozen formal characters,
carelessly met together on a slight appointment; and this further advantage
would be derived from the proposed system (which would be wanting if he had
constitutional advice to screen him), that the President must be personally
responsible for everything-for though an ingenious gentleman has proposed,
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this suggestion is not meant to subvert the object of his powers.
Dispatch, at times, such as in war, may require that opinions be
given orally.
The clause authorizing the President to require opinions of
his heads of departments is not a "trifling one[]."' 04 It may be "a
mere redundancy ... as the right for which it provides would
result of itself from the office."19 5 Nonetheless, its existence in
the Constitution certainly results from the question of a council
debated at the Convention and from the overriding concern for
executive accountability. It serves to eliminate all doubts on the
subject. Moreover, it was not placed in the Commander-in-Chief
Clause of the Constitution without rhyme or reason. At the time
the Committee of Eleven proposed its insertion into the Consti-
tution, all executive powers were spelled out in a single section,
undivided by separate clauses.196 The Committee specifically
recommended that the clause be inserted as part of the same
sentence that contains the grant of the commander-in-chief
power." 7 So it stands in the Constitution.9 ' While the clause
applies equally to all decision making incident to subsequent
grants of executive power, it demands emphasis particularly
with respect to the power, and duty, to protect and defend the
nation:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of
power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of
that a Council should be responsible for their opinions, and the same senti-
ment of justice might be applied to these opinions of the great officers, I am
persuaded it will in general be thought infinitely more safe, as well as more
just, that the President who acts should be responsible for his conduct, follow-
ing advice at his peril, than that there should be a danger of punishing any
man for an erroneous opinion which might possibly be sincere. Besides the
morality of this scheme, which may well be questioned, its inexpediency is
glaring, since it would be so plausible an excuse and the insincerity of it so
difficult to detect, the hopes of impunity this avenue to escape would afford
would nearly take away all dread of punishment.
Id. at 348-49. See also THE FEDmEALtsT No. 70, supra note 5, at 462-63 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) ("A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are gener-
ally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and
accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults.").
194 The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
,91 THE FEDERALIsT No. 74, supra note 5, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton).
I" See MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 5, at 392, 575.
197 Id. at 575.
,1, U.S. CONST. art. 1:, § 2, cl. 1.
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the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the
common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of
the executive authority. 19
To protect public liberty, the Constitution vests all execu-
tive power in the President. To protect private liberty-by mak-
ing the executive fully responsible and accountable for his ac-
tions-the Constitution denies a consultation role to the
legislature. The President need not consult with Congress or
with anyone before carrying out his duties as Commander-in-
Chief.200
3. Pardon Power
The pardon power, like the other powers granted in the
Commander-in-Chief Clause, is not subject to any check by a
coordinate branch.2 01 It extends to all public offenses, with the
exception that the President cannot pardon officers in cases of
impeachment.202 As part of the clause in which commander-in-
199 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, supra note 5, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton).
200 Consulting with Congress-the entire legislative body, see U.S. CoNsT., art. 1, §1;
text accompanying note 12 supra-itself presents practical problems. Congress acts legis-
latively only as an entire bicameral unit.
A requirement, by Congress, that the President report to it within a specified time
period on the state of military activities also is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 3, of
the Constitution provides that the President "shall from time to time give to the Con-
gress Information of the State of the Union." It is clear that "from time to time" re-
quires "frequent [reporting but] leave[s] enough to the discretion of the" executive.
MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 641 (James Madison) (discussion of Article I, Section
5, Clause 3, which requires each house of Congress to "keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same").
o' See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) ("It is the
intention of the constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the gov-
ernment-the legislative, the executive, and the judicial-shall be, in its sphere, indepen-
dent of the others. To the Executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is
granted without limit.").
201 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"). Cf. 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *398-99:
[T]he king may pardon all offences merely against the crown, or the public...
[and not where the] offence favours more of the nature of a private injury to
each individual in the neighbourhood, than a public wrong .... There is also a
restriction of a peculiar nature, that affects the prerogative of pardoning, in
case of parliamentary impeachments; viz. that the king's pardon cannot be
pleaded to any such impeachment, so as to impede the inquiry, and stop the
prosecution of great and notorious offenders.
(footnote omitted).
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chief authority is given, the pardon power is a war power. It is
granted expressly, because its function is not limited to war,
and, as it operates directly upon the individual, it has a legisla-
tive flavor. It is a war power because the pardon power was given
to the President primarily to allow the Commander-in-Chief to
offer traitors clemency as a means to ending their acts of war.2 3
James Wilson remarked, upon a motion to remove the crime
of treason from the class of offenses that may be pardoned:
Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in the
hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be
impeached and prosecuted. 04
Thus, the pardon power requires independence, unity, and dis-
patch. It is a power incident to the prosecution of public rights.
As the President, by the Constitution, is made the guardian of
public rights, it is the President who appropriately holds the
pardon power.
4. Remarks
Ours is a living Constitution. The Framers created it in ac-
cordance with the beliefs that compelled the colonists to declare
2"I [T]he principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to
the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are
often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or
rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth; and, which, if suf-
fered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall.
THE FEDERAusT No. 74, supra note 5, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton).
204 MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 646. Accord id. ("A Legislative body is utterly
unfit for the purpose. They are governed too much by the passions of the moment. In
Massachussets, one assembly would have hung all the insurgents in that State: the next
was equally disposed to pardon them all .... ) (Rufus King). Of course, prosecution
would come only after impeachment, as the President, charged with the duty to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed," U.S. CoNsr. art. II, §3, has the prosecutorial
power. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, ac-
cording to Law."); THE FEDERAL=s No. 69, supra note 5, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton)
("The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanom, removed from of-
fice; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
course of law.") (emphasis added); id. No. 77, supra note 5, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton)
(President is "at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity
to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in
the common course of law") (emphasis added).
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their independence from Great Britain, keeping in mind the
practical considerations that transform such fundamental beliefs
into a workable system of government that "secure[s] the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. 20 5 To secure
these blessings of public and of private liberty, "to ourselves and
our Posterity," we must have an understanding of the objects
upon which the Constitution's allocation of powers are founded.
Only then, by reference to the purposes that give life to our
scheme of government, can we appreciate fully the various war
and war-related powers of the political branches of our federal
government and their relationships to one another. To deter-
mine whether the President needs authority from Congress to
wage war, because the Constitution gives the legislature the
power to declare war, one must understand what that power
means and why it was vested in Congress. Every action of the
federal government must have a basis in the living document;
there are no abiogenetic constitutional rights, powers, or duties.
III. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL EN-
CROACHMENTS
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to raise
armies; to build'and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government
of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support.200
The power to direct the operations of U.S. armed forces is the
commander-in-chief authority. The other necessary defense
powers belong to Congress. These-and these alone-constitute
the legislative checks on the President's public war powers. Each
serves to protect the rights of citizens and of states against pos-
sible oppression by the executive.2 7
A. Sinew Of War: Manpower
1. Raise And Support Armies
In the British king's capacity as commander-in-chief, he
20. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
200 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 5, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton).
2'7 Cf. The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("power of command ... is not a military prerogative, without support of law, to seize
persons or property because they are important or even essential for the military and
naval establishment").
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had "the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and ar-
mies. ' 2°8 This power was abused by British monarchs by keeping
large standing armies in times of peace-a practice dangerous to
private liberty:
As incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged
prerogative of the crown, Charles H, had, by his own authority, kept
on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this num-
ber James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list.
At the revolution [in 1688], to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an
authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that
"the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of
peace, unless with the consent of Parliament, was against law.Y'2
In times of public danger, a standing army is essential; yet,
it also is the greatest threat to private liberty. As Madison
stated it, "[a] standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the
same time that it may be a necessary, provision. 21 0
In the Declaration of Independence, the thirteen colonies
declared their independence from Great Britain, listing griev-
ances that made such action necessary. In large part, the Consti-
tution "is founded upon the principles of government set forth
and maintained in the Declaration of Independence. ' 21 1 In the
latter, Thomas Jefferson penned this:
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For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any
Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these
States:-
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his
Protection and waging War against us.-
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns,
and destroyed the lives of our people.-
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Merce-
naries to complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already
begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in
the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized
nation.-
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high
Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners
of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.-
He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has en-
deavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless
Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions .... 21
The colonists experienced encroachments upon their personal
liberties, caused by abuses of a large standing army in times of
peace and by the king's use of mercenaries and the impressment
of British subjects into his armed service. Because of the experi-
ence of the colonists under British rule, "the people of America
may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger
to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. '213
To prevent such oppression, the drafters of the Articles of
Confederation sought to strike a balance between the necessary
defense provided the states by the Union and the protection of
individual and of states' rights. Article VI provided as follows:
No vessels of war shall be kept up in times of peace by any state,
except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the united
states in congress assembled, for the defence of such state, or its
trade; nor shall a body of forces be kept up by any state, in time of
peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the united
states, in congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison
the forts necessary for the defence of such state; but every state shall
always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently
armed and accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for
use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a
212 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
213 THE FEDEALIsT No. 26, supra note 5, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton).
[Vol. 57:1083
WAR POWERS
proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage.2"
The militia, a local armed force, would be maintained to protect
the state from domestic violence, from actual invasions by Indi-
ans, or from threatened invasions when the danger of any such
invasion would be so imminent that the confederate forces could
not react in time to defeat it.2"5
The states also were responsible for raising land forces for
the common defense.2 6  The Confederate Congress had the
power to "make[] rules for the government and regulation of the
said land and naval forces, and direct[] their operations. '21 7 It
also had the authority
to build and equip a navy-to agree upon the number of land forces,
and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in proportion
to the number of white inhabitants in such state; which requisition
shall be binding, and thereupon the legislature of each state shall ap-
point the regimental officers, raise the men and cloath, arm and equip
them in a soldier like manner, at the expense of the united states; and
the officers and men so cloathed, armed and equipped shall march to
the place appointed, and within the time agreed upon by the united
states in congress assembled .... 215
The Confederate Congress, however, could not "agree upon the
number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the num-
ber of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander
in chief of the army or navy, unless nine states assent to the
same. .219 This dependence upon the individual states left
the Union in a precarious state of defense.220
By placing power in the states to raise and to support
214 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VT, para. 4.
216 See id. art. VI, para. 5.
210 See id. art. VII; art. IX, para. 5.
217 Id. art. IX, para. 4.
218 Id. art. IX, para 5. The Confederate Congress also could decide that one state
should raise more forces than another, and the first state would have to provide as many
added forces as it would "judge can be safely spared." Id.
219 Id. art. IX, para. 6.
220 See, e.g., THE FEDERA-IsT No. 22, supra note 5, at 132-34 (Alexander Hamilton);
MADIsON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 29 (Edmund Randolph) (A defect of the Confederacy
is that "congress [is] not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own
authority."); Edmund Randolph, Letter on the Federal Constitution, in PAWLErS,
supra note 193, at 259, 262 (The Confederate "period is distinguished by melancholy
testimonies of its inability to maintain in harmony, the social intercourse of the States,
to defend congress against encroachments on their rights, and to obtain by requisitions,
supplies to the federal treasury, or recruits to the federal armies.").
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armed forces, the Articles of Confederation may have safe-
guarded personal liberties, but it jeopardized public liberty.
Therefore, when the delegates met in Philadelphia in the sum-
mer of 1787 to revise the system of federal government to better
protect public rights, while taking all necessary precautions to
secure individual liberties, they addressed the dichotomous fear
engendered by a standing army.221 They understood that a
standing army was necessary for defense but must be controlled
for personal security.
The Framers, in theory, agreed with Blackstone that "a dis-
tinct order of the profession of arms" is dangerous domesti-
cally.222 Therefore, they adopted, in principle, Charles Pinck-
ney's proposal that
[t]he military shall always be subordinate to the Civil power, and no
grants of money shall be made by the Legislature for supporting mili-
tary Land forces, for more than one year at a time223
By placing the command of the armed forces entirely in the
hands of an elected civilian-the President-the military was
made subordinate to the civil power.224 But, with such force at
his sole disposal, the President would be capable of encroaching
upon personal rights. He would have the strength necessary to
defend the nation from outside forces, but, if he turned that
force inward, republican liberty would be at peril. For this rea-
son, the Framers, while of necessity giving the executive the
commander-in-chief power, expressly deprived him of the ancil-
lary authority that was held by the king of Great Britain. An
early draft of the Constitution gave to Congress the power "[t]o
221 Cf. Reid v. Covert 354 U.S. 1, 24 (1957) ("Their fears were rooted in history.
They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders.").
222 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *408. Cf. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 1 (the king "has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the
Civil power").
223 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 486. Pinckney also proposed the following
clause: "No troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but by consent of the Legislature."
Id. (Charles Pinckney). This clause was rejected. The Framers did not want to give Con-
gress a concurrent, or subsequent, check on the President's war power. Once Congress
decides to keep a standing army for, at most, two years, by making appropriations for
that use, see notes 231-32 and accompanying text infra, it effectively gives command to
the Commander-in-Chief for the duration.
I" See The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the civilian would
control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential office.").
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raise armies" and, following the language of the Articles of Con-
federation, the power "[t]o build and equip fleets. 225
In this manner, the duty to defend the nation was divided
between the political branches of government. The legislature,
the branch closest to the people and representative of conflicting
local concerns, was given the direct power over the people. It, in
conjunction with the President,226 would determine when the
safety of the nation would require armed forces over and above
the militia of the states.227
On August 18, 1787, it was unanimously agreed that the
words "and support" would follow "[tlo raise," in the clause
vesting in the legislature the power over establishing land
forces. 28 This gave Congress the express power over some of the
means of war-both over the men comprising land forces and
over the money appropriations for their support. On August 20,
Pinckney moved to place a time restriction on the appropria-
tions for the support of an army. Pickney's idea, borrowed from
the British Bill of Rights,229 further secures republican liberty.
On September 5, 1787, the Committee of Eleven reported its
adoption, in principle, of this addition to the war-related powers
of Congress. But, "[a]s the Legislature is to be biennially
elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be
for one year, ' 230 so the Committee modified the proposal. The
phrase as reported by the Committee, adopted unanimously, and
inserted into the clause giving the legislature the power "[11o
raise and support armies," reads "but no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years."'2 31
This authority, to prevent the establishment or continuation of a
25 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 389. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1318 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting) ("the Founding Fathers deliberately es-
chewed the example of the British Monarchy in which was lodged the authority to de-
clare war and to raise and regulate fleets and armies"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
The power to declare war will be addressed at notes 374-443 and accompanying text
infra.
228 The President has constitutionally granted powers of participation in the legisla-
tive process, necessary as a check upon the controlling passions of the Congress. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 Presentment Clause).
221 See note 238 and accompanying text infra.
228 See MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 481.
29 See text accompanying note 209 supra.
220 MADISON's NoTEs. supra note 4, at 580 (Roger Sherman).
221 Id. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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standing army in times of peace, dangerous to individual liber-
ties, .gives Congress the power to check any propensity of the
President for self-aggrandizement and tyranny.2 2
Once an army is raised, it is under the direction of the Pres-
ident as Commander-in-Chief.233  Unless supported by money
appropriations at least once every two years, the standing land
force is disbanded. In the President's hands, an adequate army
has the strength requisite to defend the nation, on land. With-
out that force, the Presiden.t is powerless to encroach upon per-
sonal rights.
While this authority to raise and support armies is an effec-
tual check upon presidential encroachments upon individual lib-
erty, the Framers believed it to be incomplete. They firmly be-
lieved in the necessity of keeping local armed forces available to
protect the states. At the Convention, James Madison remarked:
As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary
to guard [against] it by sufficient powers to the Common Govt. and as
the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best
to prevent them, by an effectual provision for a good Militia.2 34
Congress, given the direct authority over the people and over the
states, also is empowered
232 Cf. Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 480 (W.D. Va. 1970) ("the Founding Fathers
envisioned congressional power to raise and support military forces as providing that
body with an effective means of controlling presidential use thereof") (footnote omitted).
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at
least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military
force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their
sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are
not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the
support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose
in it so improper a confidence.
THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 5, at 163 (Alexander Hamilton).
213 The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United
States and of the militia when called into actual service of the United States. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The President has no authority to command any other armed
individuals. He cannot direct foreign mercenary land forces. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (the king "is at this time transporting large Armies of
foreign Mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already be-
gun with circumstances of Cruelty & Perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous
ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation"); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24
n.43 (1957) ("Washington warned that 'Mercenary Armies ... have at one time or an-
other subverted the liberties of almost all the Countries they have been raised to defend
.... '") (citation omitted).
13' MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 516.
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To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appoint-
ment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia accord-
ing to the discipline prescribed by Congress .... 23
5
To protect and defend the nation, the federal government is
given power over the militia. To secure personal and states' lib-
erties, however, the power over the militia is shared with, but
distinctly divided between the federal government and, the
states. 3 6 Congress is given, temporally, the primary power of the
federal government over the militia. The federal legislature must
call forth the militia before the Commander-in-Chief takes its
command. The President is charged with protecting and defend-
ing public rights; Congress, securing personal rights, aids in the
ultimate object of common defense by providing the President
with the means. 37
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16. George Mason, of Virginia,
being sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing armies in time of peace
might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to insert something pointing
out and guarding against the danger of them, moved to preface the clause (Art.
I sect. 8) "To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia &c"
with the words "And that the liberties of the people may be better secured
against the danger of standing armies in time of peace" Mr. RANDOLPH
2ded. the motion.
MADISON's NoTES, supra note 4, at 639. The motion was defeated, so as not to "set[] a
dishonorable mark of distinction on the military class of Citizens." Id. (Gouverneur Mor-
ris). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.').
236 [The President] is elected ... for a brief term of four years, and is made
personally responsible, by impeachment, for malfeasance in office; he is, from
necessity, and the nature of his duties, the commander-in-chief of the army
and navy, and of the militia, when called into actual service; but no appropria-
tion for the support of the army can be made by congress for a longer term
than two years, so that it is in the power of the succeeding house of representa-
tives to withhold the appropriation for its support, and thus disband it, if, in
their judgment, the president used, or designed to use it for improper pur-
poses. And although the militia, when in actual service, is under his command,
yet the appointment of the officers is reserved to the states, as a security
against the use of the military power for purposes dangerous to the liberties of
the people, or the rights of the states.
Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)(No. 9487). See also Kinsella
v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 268 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
27 Of course, the Constitution expressly gives to Congress this authority. The Nec-
WAR POWERS 113919921
BROOKLYN -LAW REVIEW
The power of the federal government over the militia was
intended to limit the necessity of a standing land force stationed
in the United States. If the federal government could maintain
internal and external peace by quashing interruptions to the
peace with, or primarily with, the militia, then there would be
no need for Congress to raise or support an army, or, at least, a
large one. Hamilton explained:
If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free coun-
try, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of
that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the
militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is com-
mitted, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the
pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can
command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the
military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dis-
pense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot
avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To
render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of
preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.2 38
There were a few delegates at the Philadelphia Convention
who, despite the necessity of a standing army, were so fearful of
potential abuses impairing individual rights that they wanted a
constitutionally imposed limitation on the number of troops to
be kept in times of peace. One of this overwhelming minority
was Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who, before the check on
appropriations was provided, objected:
He thought an army dangerous in time of peace & could never consent
essary and Proper Clause would not give the legislature the power over the means neces-
sary to carry into execution the duty of the Commander-in-Chief to protect and defend
the nation. The means, without express limitation, remain with the department upon
which the general power is conferred. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
238 THE FEDERALIST No. 29, supra note 5, at 176-77 (Alexander Hamilton). Cf.
MADISON's NoTES, supra note 4, at 478:
Mr. MASON introduced the subject of regulating the militia. He thought such
a power necessary to be given to the Genl. Government. He hoped there would
be no standing army in time of peace, unless it might be for a few garrisons.
The Militia ought therefore to be the more effectually prepared for the public
defence. Thirteen States will never concur in any one system, if the displining
[sic] of the Militia be left in their hands. If they will not give up the power
over the whole, they probably will over a part as a select militia. He moved as
an addition to the propositions just referred to the Committee of detail, & to
be referred in like manner, "a power to regulate the militia."
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to a power to keep up an indefinite number. He proposed that there
shall not be kept up in time of peace more than - thousand
troops. His idea was that the blank should be filled with two or three
thousand.
2
3
9
The Framers, however, did not restrict in any way the ability of
Congress to raise land forces in times of peace. Just as with the
commander-in-chief power, and unlike some other provisions in
the Constitution, the clause empowering the legislature to raise
and support armies does not contain the restrictive phrase, "in
time of war. ' 240 There are two reasons for this. First, while
standing armies can, and under British rule did, encroach upon
personal liberties, a conspiracy between the executive and the
legislature to inflict tyranny upon the people, takes time and
cannot suddenly be sprung upon the states and upon its inhabi-
tants without sufficient warning. 241 Hamilton wrote:
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a. great community require time to
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;
which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between
the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series
"9 MADISON'S NoTs, supra note 4, at 482 (footnote omitted). Luther Martin, of
Maryland, and Gerry moved to insert "provided that in time of peace the army shall not
consist of more than - thousand men." Id. It was rejected unanimously. Id.
240 See note 147 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Rappeport,
36 F. Supp. 915, 916-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1941):
The provisions of the Constitution granting power to Congress to raise and
support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy and to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces.., do not restrict the
exercise of such power to "time of war" nor do they impose any limitation as to
the time or manner of exercising such power. It can not be assumed that the
Constitution intended to prevent the raising of an army by voluntary enlist-
ment or conscription until war has been declared or actually begun. The provi-
sions can not be construed so as to restrict the exercise of the power in a way
requiring a delay that may render the grant of the power useless.
Cf. United States v. Garst, 39 F. Supp. 367, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ("The legislative history
of the Constitution itself disposes of the contention... that the power 'To raise and
support Armies' is limited to volunteer service in such armies in peace time.").
241 Cf. THE DECLARA7ON OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (describing the "pa-
tient sufferances of these Colonies"):
[The king] has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to
our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their
Acts of pretended Legislation:- For quartering large bodies of armed troops
among us.... We have warned [our British brethren] from time to time of
attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us..
. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.
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of time.2 42
Accordingly, the states and the people would be able to defend
themselves against the conspiracy before their liberties are
lost.2 43
Second, and more important, without raising and support-
ing armies in times of peace, the nation cannot take measures to
defend itself, while there still is time, or discourage aggression
by other nations. Thus, when Luther Martin and Elbridge Gerry
moved to place a limitation upon the size of a standing army,244
General Pinckney of South Carolina "asked whether no troops
were ever to be raised untill [sic] an attack should be made on
uAs? ''245 The Philadelphia Convention agreed with the implica-
tion of Pinckney's rhetorical question. If the United States, con-
stitutionally, could not establish an army to defend itself in
times of peace, then the nation may be forfeited in the name of
liberty. Public rights must be paramount to personal liberty, to
secure the latter effectively. If, to prevent invasions upon civil
liberties,
it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies
in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most ex-
traordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen,-that of a nation
incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defence, before it was
actually invaded .... We must receive the blow, before we could even
prepare to return it .... We must expose our property and liberty to
the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to
seize .the naked and defenceless prey, because we are afraid that rul-
ers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that
liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.2 0
By the Constitution, "the whole power of raising armies was
lodged in the Legislature.' '247 Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, of
the Constitution prohibits the states from keeping troops or
ships of war in times of peace without the consent of Congress.
242 THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 5, at 164 (Alexander Hamilton).
24 See id. No. 46, at 310-11 (James Madison). See also U.S. CoNsT. amend. II ("A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed") (emphasis added); THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 29, supra note 5, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton).
244 See note 239 and accompanying text supra.
245 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 482.
246 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 5, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton).
217 Id. No. 24, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton).
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No limitation, other than the constitutionally imposed restric-
tion on appropriations for longer than two years and the doc-
trine of separation of powers, lawfully can be imposed on the
federal legislature's power to raise and support armies.240 As the
power to raise and support armies was given to Congress, it can-
not be limited. All necessary and proper means to that end fol-
low from it, save those that are denied to Congress by the Con-
stitution.24 The power to raise and support armies means the
power to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the sinew of war
for an effective common defense "against an enemy, actual or
potential. We are not precluded from preparing for battle, if
battle must come, until such time as our preparation would be
too late. '250
To effectively meet force with force,25' the Commander-in-
Chief requires a force of like kind to that of the enemy.252
Therefore, the Constitution cannot limit Congress's authority to
prepare for war.253 "How could a readiness for war in time of
peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like man-
ner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile na-
tion?" Madison asked rhetorically.2" He continued:
248 See id. No. 23, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) ("there can be no limitation of that
authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community, in any
matter .. . essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL
FORCES"). See also Hughes, supra note 46, at 233. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 305 (1942) ("Congress can draft men for battle service[; ilts
power to draft business organizations to support the fighting men who risk their lives can
be no less") (citation omitted); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622, 624 (1931)
(power to raise army includes "power to say who shall serve... and in what way," and
"without regard to his... views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war
or of war in general"), overruled on other grounds, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61 (1946); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (Congress's power includes
"power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen"); United States v. Beit Bros., 50
F. Supp. 590, 593 (D. Conn. 1943) ("the Congress has the power to provide by legislation
for the production and delivery of food for the armed forces").
249 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause). See also Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 407-08.
250 United States v. Lambert, 123 F.2d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 1941).
251 See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
252 THE FEDERALIT No. 25, supra note 5, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully con-
ducted by a force of the same kind.").
253 Id. No. 41, supra note 5, at 261 (James Madison) ("With what color of propriety
could force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of
offence?").
2 Id. at 262.
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The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the
danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules,
and by no others.25
Congress has a constitutionally prescribed, antecedent func-
tion to prepare for war by gathering the resources of the nation
essential to wage war successfully. Once those resources are col-
lected, they are put into the President's hands. 08 It is his duty
to direct those resources as he deems fit to protect the United
States. Both departments, by fiat of the Constitution, must ex-
ercise their assigned powers for the same purpose-to "provide
for the common defence."
The President has the transcendent duty to "preserve, pro-
tect and defend" the nation. While the President's war power is
extensive, so are the war-related powers of Congress. The Presi-
dent's responsibility is the general preservation and protection
of public rights. To guard against abuses of this vast power,
Congress is granted those powers, necessary for the common de-
fense, that act directly upon an individual's life, liberty, and
property. Congress's powers to provide "for the common defense
are broad and far-reaching, for while the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact. '2 7
Few persons would be so visionary as seriously to contend that mili-
tary forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an inva-
sion; and if the defence of the community under such circumstances
should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard
its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither
preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible
form of government; it might even result from a simple league offen-
sive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates
or allies to form an army for common defence.258
While a standing army is dangerous to republican liberty, it
often is essential to public liberty and may become so for the
purpose of collective self-defense.
255 Id. (emphasis added).
286 Cf. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 30, at 212 ("When once an army is established, it
ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this
from the very nature of the thing; its business consisting more in action than in
deliberation.").
27 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963).
218 THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 5, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added).
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2. Provide and Maintain a Navy
Aside from the power to raise and support armies, Congress
is given authority "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy. " 2 0 An
early draft of the Constitution copied the language of the Arti-
cles of Confederation and granted to the legislature the power
"to build and equip a navy .... "2'"0 Later the wording was
changed, by a unanimous vote, to reflect "a more convenient
definition of the power."'26 ' Unlike the power to raise and sup-
port armies, the power to provide and maintain a navy is not
restricted by a constitutionally imposed maximum term on ap-
propriations of money. This is because of the difference in na-
ture between a standing army and a navy. A standing army,
while often essential to public liberty, can be dangerous to per-
sonal rights. A navy, necessary to the common defense, is not to
be feared as a means to encroach upon individual rights. Thus, a
navy should be maintained at all times.6 2
James Madison, during the early stages of the Convention,
when the delegates still were debating the structure of the new
federal government, elucidated this distinction:
The means of defence [against] foreign danger, have been always the
instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing
maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Through-
out all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending,
have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best
concerted system of absolute power in Europe cd. maintain itself, in a
situation, where no alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to
the domestic yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the princi-
pal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It
has rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence
wch. cd. not be used for the purpose of oppression.2
The fear of the Framers was that the United States would be
turned into a theater of war. It needed protection from invasion,
2. U. S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
260 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 5; IMDISoN's NOTES, supra note 4,
at 389.
261 MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 482.
262 Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (power "[t]o raise and support Armies")
(emphasis added) with id., cL. 13 (power "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy") (emphasis
added).
262 MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 214-15. The kind of defense that cannot be
used to oppress the people, referred to by Madison, is a naval force. See note 266 and
accompanying text infra.
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from rebellion, and from encroachments upon the rights of its
citizens. The apprehension was not that men would be sent
abroad to defend the homeland and to protect citizens and the
national interest. Rather, it was the danger to the life, liberty,
and property of American civilians that was most to be feared. If
stationing troops abroad would protect the nation from foreign
invasion or from public danger, that method of defense would be
preferable. The danger from land forces is the possible use of
those forces to invade personal rights of Americans and not its
utility in repelling attack. Accordingly, all branches of the
armed forces-like the navy, air force, and marines-that are
not kept among the people, pose a far lesser danger, and, there-
fore, there is no need to limit the appropriations for their sup-
port.264 The legislature is given the power to provide for these
branches of the armed forces, for that entails direct interference
with an individual's liberty. But, once these forces are provided,
the Commander-in-Chief has full command over them.2 05
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy
has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure,
which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered
among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be
the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal
source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our
situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great
Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises
on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidi-
ous government against our liberties.
2
1
6
The war powers of the United States are divided to guard
against the dichotomous fears that perpetually plague a repub-
lic. By giving the President the commander-in-chief power, the
Framers provided strength in the federal government to protect
and defend the nation. By vesting in Congress the power to pro-
vide the Commander-in-Chief with the sinew of war-the men
and the money necessary to wage war successfully-by levying
'" Similarly, there is no cause for apprehension that a land force stationed abroad
can be employed by the Commander-in-Chief to infringe upon individual liberties of
American citizens.
268 The President's command is subject only to compliance with the rules for the
government and regulation of armed forces prescribed by Congress. See notes 267-75 and
accompanying text infra.
211 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 5, at 266 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
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directly upon the people, the Framers secured the liberty of the
individual members of the nation.
B. Rules For Government And Regulation
At the Philadelphia Convention, on August 18, 1787, the
Framers added to the powers of Congress the power "[t]o make
rules for the Government and regulation of the land & naval
forces. 267 This power previously was vested in the Confederate
Congress under the Articles of Confederation.26 8 The Constitu-
tion gives this authority to the legislature, rather than to the
President, for two reasons. First, it is a power conferred upon
Congress to protect general personal rights of civilian citizens
against abuse by the Commander-in-Chief through the use of
the armed forces placed under his direction. Second, this power
necessarily is vested in the legislative branch to guard against
potential invasions into the limited personal liberties of the
members of the armed forces of the United States.
One of the grievances against Great Britain listed in the
Declaration of Independence was that the king acquiesced in
Parliament's "pretended Legislation" for the protection of the
armed land forces of Great Britain "by a mock Trial, from pun-
ishment for any Murders which they should commit on the In-
habitants of these States." The authority of the legislature to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces" empowers Congress to establish military
tribunals to try members of the armed forces. This acts as a
safeguard against the use of "mock Trials," by the Commander-
in-Chief, allowing military personnel to go unpunished for un-
lawful encroachments upon the "life, liberty, and property" of
civilians.26 9
This authority of Congress also "creates an exception to the
normal method of trial in civilian courts as provided by the Con-
67 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 482. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, eL 14.
2'8 See ARTmLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 4 ("making rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the said land and naval forces"); MAmisON's NOTES, supra note 4,
at 482 (power "added from the existing Articles of the Confederation").
"I Cf. United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci, 26
M.J. 328, 330 (C.M.A. 1988) ("in the exercise of its constitutional authority as to the
armed forces, Congress may grant an Article I court, such as this Court, the power to
prevent officials of the Executive Branch from interfering with the administration of mil-
itary justice").
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stitution and permits Congress to authorize military trial of
members of the armed services without all the safeguards given
an accused by Article III and the Bill of Rights. '270 Because
there often is no time for ordinary trial procedures when trying
members of the military service, Congress is given the power to
prescribe swifter, more efficient methods of trying individuals in
the armed forces.271 The President's use of the armed forces, in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, to secure public safety, re-
quires vigor and dispatch. "When a person enters the military
service, whether as officer or private, he surrenders his personal
70 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957). See also Wickham v. Hall, 706 F.2d 713,
715 (5th Cir. 1983). It "was intended to be only a narrow exception to the normal and
preferred method of trial in courts of law." Reid, 354 U.S. at 21. See also Dynes v. Hoo-
ver, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858):
These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now prac-
ticed by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any
connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judi-
cial power of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely inde-
pendent of each other.
Article III prescribes the judicial power of the United States. An example of the
safeguards provided therein is that "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. A jury trial is not required in the
military courts. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137 (1866) (Chase, C.J.,
concurring):
[T]he power to make rules for the government of the army and navy is a power
to provide for trial and punishment by military courts without a jury. It has
been so understood and exercised from the adoption of the Constitution to the
present time.
Similarly, the right to a grand jury does not apply to cases arising in the armed forces.
The Fifth Amendment provides as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger ....
(emphasis added). This exception was "designed to correlate with the power granted
Congress to provide for the 'Government and Regulation' of the armed services .... "
Reid, 354 U.S. at 22. Accord Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 138 (Chase, C.J., concurring)
("we understand this exception to have the same import and effect as if the powers of
Congress in relation to the government of the army and navy and the militia had been
recited in the amendment, and cases within those powers had been expressly excepted
from its operation").
271 See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123:
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army or navy, required other
and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts; and,
in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has de-
clared the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for
offences committed while the party is in the military or naval service.
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rights and submits himself to a code of laws and obligations
wholly inconsistent with the principles which measure our con-
stitutional rights. '27 2
Congress is authorized by the Constitution, as a check upon
potential presidential encroachments upon individual liberties,
both to raise and provide armies and a navy and to make rules
for their government and regulation. Thus, the legislature deter-
mines the manner in which citizens of the United States will be
deprived of certain personal rights by being chosen to serve in
the armed forces and in which way a trial, which may deprive
them further of the individual rights of "life, liberty, and prop-
erty," will be conducted. Again, the President's power and duty
to protect and defend the nation is balanced against the individ-
ual's interest in republican liberty. Public liberty, necessarily, is
paramount but, in the United States, is meaningless, if it is not
preserved to secure personal liberty.
By the Constitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces. He has the authority to direct and to em-
ploy the military services placed under his command. The power
to make rules for the government and regulation of the military
belongs to Congress.
[T]he two powers are distinct; neither can trench upon the other, the
President can not, under the disguise of military orders, evade the
legislative regulations by which he in common with the Army must be
governed; and Congress can not in the disguise of "rules for the gov-
ernment" of the Army impair the authority of the President as com-
mander in chief.2 7
The power to make rules for the government and regulation
of the armed forces is not qualified by the requirement of the
existence of peace or of war. It applies "to times of both peace
and war. '274 The duty to provide for the common defense is
shared by the executive and by the legislature. As Commander-
"' Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. CL 173, 217 (1893), affd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
17 Id. at 221. Cf. McBlair v. United States, 19 Ct. CL 528, 541 (1884) ("While the
President is made commander-in-chief by the Constitution, Congress have the right to
legislate for the Army, not impairing his efficiency as such commander-in-chief, and
when a law is passed for the regulation of the Army, having that constitutional qualifi-
cation, he becomes as to that law an executive officer, and is limited in the discharge of
this duty by the statute.") (emphasis added).
"I" Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 275 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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in-Chief, the President is obligated to secure public safety. As
far as republican liberty can be safeguarded, consistent with the
President's power over the military, the Constitution has con-
ferred upon Congress the power to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the armed forces, to secure personal
liberty.275
C. Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, Etc.
The Constitution vests in Congress the power to exercise ex-
clusive legislation 27 1 "over all Places purchased by the Consent
of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings. 2 7 7 The power to purchase these
properties, essential to the common defense, is made subject to
the consent of the state legislatures in the states in which the
properties are located. The power to erect as well as to govern
forts and other needful buildings belonged exclusively to the
king of Great Britain, at the time of the drafting of the Consti-
tution .276 Because this power necessarily implicates state and in-
dividual rights over property,279 however, the Framers wrote into
our Constitution safeguards against the potential abuse of this
power.
In an earlier draft of the Constitution, the power of the fed-
eral government was not qualified by the condition that the
state legislature must consent to the purchase of such prop-
erty.280 But,
Mr. Gerry contended that this power might be made use of to enslave
276 Cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983):
It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have
plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the
Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies re-
lated to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in con-
formity with that view.
278 "Exclusive legislation" means exclusive as against the states. Legislative power,
in the federal government, is vested in Congress. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note
5, at 280 (James Madison) (necessity of exclusive authority of the federal government
over forts, magazines, etc., as against states).
277 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
278 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *263.
279 Cf. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
280 See MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 580.
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any particular State by buying up its territory, and that the
strongholds proposed would be a means of awing the State into an
undue obedience to the Genl. Government.
2sz
Therefore, Rufus King proposed that the words "by the consent
of the Legislature of the State" be added to the clause as re-
ported.282 This modification was agreed to unanimously.2 13
At the Convention, Madison submitted to the Committee of
Detail a proposal to add to the powers of Congress the power
"[t]o authorize the Executive to procure and hold for the use of
the U.S. landed property for the erection of Forts, Magazines,
and other necessary buildings. '284 This proposal was rejected in
favor of the language referred to above.285 Under the Constitu-
tion, Congress was not interposed between the President and the
states, in the purchase of property within the boundaries of the
latter, for the erection of buildings essential to the defense of
the nation. As most effective to secure the safety of the states
against encroachments by the federal government, however, the
state legislatures were given the power to consent to the
purchase of land located within their borders. The Framers de-
termined that this would be the safest check, consistent with
public liberty, on possible executive oppression by abuse of this
authority. Because the power to erect forts and other needful
buildings, which, as an executive power, belonged to the king of
281Great Britain, was not restricted by the grant of a check to
Congress, the authority to erect, as distinguished from the power
to govern, forts and other needful buildings is an executive
power necessary to protect and defend the nation. Congress's
power over these "places on which the security of the entire
Union may depend" 287 extends only to the exercise of legislation
over such places. To secure best republican liberty, however, a
281 Id. at 581.
282 Id. "This would certainly make the power safe," King added. Id. This restriction
on the power to purchase property for the erection of forts or other needful buildings is
analogous to that on the quartering of soldiers. That provision of the Bill of Rights pro-
vides that "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S.
CONST. amend. DI (emphasis added).
MADISON'S NorEs, supra note 4, at 581.
284 Id. at 477.
282 See note 277 and accompanying text supra.
286 See 1 WmLIuf BLACKSTONE, CoMm'NTARms *262-63.
28 THE FEDERALIsT No. 43, supra note 5, at 280 (James Madison).
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state's legislature must consent to the purchase of land within
its borders upon which the Commander-in-Chief would like to
build a military installation.
D. The Power of the Purse and Related Authorities
1. Purse Power
The next legislative check on possible executive oppression
is the taxing power.
In Great Britain, it was the privilege and the right of the
House of Commons, the more numerous branch of Parliament
and the one closest to the people, to originate tax bills.2 8 In the
United States,
[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as
on other Bills.2"
This stands in contrast to the British model, in which the House
of Lords was not permitted to amend money bills but only to
accept or to reject them.2 0 Thus, the power of origination of the
House of Commons was greater than that of the House of Rep-
resentatives. This results from the division in classes in British
society that is not found but, rather, is prohibited in America.29
The lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleasure by
the king, are supposed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and
once influenced to continue so, than the commons, who are a tempo-
rary, elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would therefore
be extremely dangerous, to give the lords any power of framing new
taxes for the subject: it is sufficient that they have a power of re-
jecting, if they think the commons too lavish or improvident in their
'8 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169.
'88 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The clause granting the House of Representatives
the power to originate all bills for raising revenue, which prescribes the mechanism for
the passage of a bill and the method by which it becomes a law, is a procedural rule and
not a substantive power. The substantive power of Congress to legislate for the raising of
revenue is provided in Section 8 6f Article 1:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
280 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169-70.
291 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States .... ).
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grants. 292
Similar fears were voiced at the Philadelphia Convention
with respect to the suggestion that the Senate be permitted to
originate money bills for raising revenue. George Mason of Vir-
ginia thought that
[t]he duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to
that duration. On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the
smallness of the number, it was an argument against adding this to
the other great powers vested in that body. His idea of Aristocracy
was that it was the governt. of the few over the many... The purse
strings should never be put into its hands." 3
Edmund Randolph, also of Virginia, was apprehensive of a con-
spiracy between the President and the Senate, whose coopera-
tion is necessary in some matters of foreign affairs, by which the
executive could achieve an undesirable and dangerous influence
over the legislature in matters of raising revenue by direct levy
over the people.9 4
The subject of the origination of money bills, both for rais-
ing revenue and for spending, was a repeated topic of debate at
the Convention. One reason for granting the House of Repre-
sentatives the exclusive authority to originate bills for the pur-
pose of raising revenue is to protect the people by allowing only
taxation through representation.8 5 As the immediate represent-
atives of the people, the members of the House of Representa-
tives should be the ones to have this power. Another reason for
so vesting the power in the House was as a "sweetener," for the
292 1 WILL M BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169-70.
292 MADISO's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 413.
294 Randolph pointed out that
[w]e had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to
increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an
aristocracy, and in the president, the form at least of a little monarch, will not
their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their immediate repre-
sentatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them.-The Execu-
tive will have more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Reps. Allow
the Senate to originate in this case, & that influence will be sure to mix itself
in their deliberations & plans.
MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 448.
292 See, e,g., MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 113 (Elbridge Gerry), 114 (Charles
Pinckney), 436 (Edmund Randolph), 443 (CoL George Mason). Accord id. at 445 (El-
bridge Gerry) ("Taxation & representation are strongly associated in the minds of the
people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall med-
dle with their purses.").
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benefit of the larger states, for agreeing to the Great Compro-
mise, by which representation in the House would be propor-
tional to the population of the states and in the Senate would be
equal among all states. 296 The power of the Senate to amend rev-
enue raising bills was deemed necessary to prevent extortion by
the House of Representatives.2 9 7
On September 5, after many debates, the following clause
was agreed to, as a compromise, in the Committee of Eleven:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Represent-
atives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the
Senate: no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in conse-
quence of appropriations made by law.298
On September 8, 1787, the words "and shall be subject to altera-
tions and amendments by the Senate" were changed to those
found in the Massachusetts Constitution. The language adopted
is this: "but the Senate may propose or concur with amend-
ments as in other bills. ''299
This adopted language ensures that all bills for the raising
of revenue-the lawful taking of property, in the form of money,
from the people-shall originate in the House, the more numer-
ous and popular branch of the legislature. It reduces the likeli-
hood of extortion, by providing that the Senate may concur with
or propose amendments. It does not require House origination of
spending bills. Accordingly, the Origination Clause does not fet-
ter the functioning of the federal government.3 0 0
This is in contrast to the Confederate Congress which had
the power "to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be
raised for the service of the united states ..... ,0o It, however,
could not "ascertain the sums ... necessary for the defence and
welfare of the united states, or any of them" without the assent
of at least nine states. 302 Moreover, the states held the authority
to levy the taxes that would supply the treasury with the
amount of money deemed necessary by the Confederate
29 See, e.g., id. at 414 (Oliver Ellsworth), 436, 442 (Edmund Randolph).
297 See, e.g., id. at 113 (Pierce Butler), 444 (James Wilson).
29 Id. at 580.
299 Id. at 607.
300 See, e.g., id. at 413 (Charles Pinckney), 414 (James Madison). See also note 313
infra.
201 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 5.
202 Id. para. 6.
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Congress. s0 3
Edmund Randolph, in opening the business of the Philadel-
phia Convention, described the defects of the Confederate Con-
gress. Among these listed deficiencies was that it was "not being
permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own au-
thority. 3 0 4 The Confederate Congress was fully dependent upon
the states. One of the most significant powers that it lacked was
the revenue raising, or taxing, power. All of the principal powers
of the federal government, including war, have at least some re-
lation to money.305 The authority to raise revenue is a significant
war-related power. The federal government now possesses all the
powers of war; the Confederate Congress did not."0 '
Hamilton wrote that the power of taxation "is the most im-
portant of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the
Union. '30 7 This is so, because virtually all other powers of the
SOS Id. art. VIM
All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for the com-
mon defence or general welfare... shall be defrayed out of a common trea-
sury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of
all land within each state, granted to or surveyed for any Person, as such land
and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to
such mode as the united states in congress assembled, shall from time to time
direct and appoint.
30 MADisoN's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 29. Randolph later wrote that the Confeder-
ate "period is distinguished by melancholy testimonies of its inability... to obtain by
requisitions, supplies to the federal treasury, or recruits to the federal armies." Ran-
dolph, supra note 220, at 262. See also 1A DSON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 7 (preface)
("the radical infirmity of the 'arts. of Confederation' was the dependence of Congs. on
the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its Requisitions, by so many indepen-
dent Communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests & convenience
and distrusting the compliance of the others").
31' See MAInSON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 416 (James Wilson) ("All the principal
powers of the Natl. Legislature had some relation to money."); id. at 445 (James Wilson)
("War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of the GenL Government. All of
them are connected with money.").
306 That Congress did not possess all the powers of war is self-evident from this
consideration alone, that she never attempted to lay any kind of tax on the
people of the United States, but relied altogether on the State Legislatures to
impose taxes, to raise money to carry on the war, and to sink the emissions of
all the paper money issued by Congress.... In every free country the power of
laying taxes is considered a legislative power over the property and persons of
the citizens; and this power the people of the United States, granted to their
State Legislatures, and they neither could, nor did transfer it to Congress; but
on the contrary they expressly stipulated that it should remain with them.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199, 232 (1796).
307 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, supra note 5, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton).
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federal government depend upon money for their support.
Money, of course, is a "sinew of war. 30 8 It was accepted by the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention that "[ihe purse &
the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legis-
lative or Executive." 309 Again, the fear here was of encroach-
ments on individual liberty.310 The fear was that a tax could be
exacted, without consent through direct representation, and, fur-
ther, that military force could be exerted to force compliance.3 11
[F]ire & water themselves are not more incompatible that [sic] such a
mixture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the militia march
from one State to another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from
the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they maintain an army
for this purpose? Will not the Citizens of the invaded State assist one
another till they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union altogether.
Rebellion is the only case, in which the military force of the State can
be properly exerted [against] its Citizens.3 1 2
Thus, the fear of the sword in the executive, essential to the
safety of the public, is not that it will be used to duel against
external forces, to protect and defend the nation, but, rather,
that it will be turned inward and employed against the people of
the United States.
The power of the purse is the power to lay and collect taxes.
This power belongs to the legislature.3 13 Without the money col-
301 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 281 (Charles Pinckney).
Id. at 81 (Col. George Mason).
Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *310:
[T]his precedent [of levying assessments] being . . . abused into a means of
oppression, (in levying scutages on the landholders by the royal authority only,
whenever our kings went to war, in order to hire mercenary troops and pay
their contingent expenses) it became thereupon a matter of national complaint;
and King John was obliged to promise in his magna carta, that no scutage
should be imposed without the consent of the common council of the realm.
(footnote omitted).
3" The fear would be identical if the sword were kept by Congress. In fact, the
sentence preceding the one quoted in the text, see note 309 and accompanying text infra,
was as follows: "The Executive power ought to be well secured agst. Legislative usurpa-
tions on it."
32 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 158 (Col. George Mason) (footnotes omitted).
M3 While it is empowered to lay and collect taxes, other than as comprehended by
the Necessary and Proper Clause and by its authority to support armed forces, Congress
is not given the power to spend. Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, provides that "[aIll Bills
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." A prior draft of the
Constitution included in this clause the origination of appropriations bills as well. See
MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 386. That earlier provision also added the following:
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lected from the people, pursuant to legislation, the President
could not carry on war.114 Until this money, by act of Congress,
is gathered into the treasury, the Commander-in-Chief could not
wage war, because "the means of carrying on the war would not
"No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations
that shall originate in the House of Representatives." This latter portion of the clause is
the genesis of the provision now found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropri-
ations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
This restriction does not confer a spending power upon the legislature. The Constitution
nowhere expressly vests an appropriations power in Congress, save with respect to sup-
porting U.S. armed forces. See note 228 and accompanying text supra. Otherwise, it has
the power to spend only by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Accordingly,
when necessary and proper for carrying into execution powers of other departments, the
legislature must provide spending. See note 83 and accompanying text supra. Cf.
MADIsoN's Nor-s, supra note 4, at 452 (Elbridge Gerry) (If ambassadors are appointed,
"the House of Reps will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of
the measures or not."); id. at 588 (James Wilson) (power to make treaties involves subsi-
dies); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 (1792) (order of court "might be a means
of drawing money out of the public treasury as effectually as an express appropriation by
law").
As noted at notes 319-31 and accompanying text infra, the power of Congress to lay
and collect taxes is limited to raising revenue for the purposes of paying debts and of
providing for the common defense and for the general welfare. Thus, when preparing tax
bills, the legislature makes general appropriations. It decides to raise a certain sum of
money in accordance with each of these permitted purposes. This, in conjunction with
the Necessary and Proper Clause and its authority to support armed forces, constitutes
Congress's appropriations power. Cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDEATION art. IX, para. 5 (Con-
federate Congress had authority "to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised
for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying
the public expenses"). Congress does not have independent authority to legislate the
application and disbursement of the money raised, save with respect to U.S. armed
forces. In The Federalist No. 72, supra note 5, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton), "the
administration of government," which is "the province of the executive department," is
described as follows:
The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance,
the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the
general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and
navy, the direction of the operations of war,--these, and other matters of like
nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the adminis-
tration of government.
(emphasis added). The legislature holds the power of the purse-the authority to levy
taxes on the people. Once the money is raised for general purposes, Congress generally
does not have an independent power to spend.
311 Cf. Randolph, supra note 220, at 265-66 (it was evident to the Framers, as a
result of their experience under the Articles of Confederation, "that the operations of
peace and war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and that these will be
slow indeed, if dependent on supplication alone").
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
be in the hands of the President, but of the Legislature. '" 316 As
with the power to raise armies, the taxing power is placed in the
hands of Congress. It makes the initial move to provide for na-
tional defense. With respect to men and money, the sinews of
war, Congress has the authority to determine the amounts that
will be levied from the people. Once tax dollars are collected and
soldiers are raised-except insofar as there is a constitutional
limitation on appropriations for the use of standing armies for a
period of two years and a constitutionally delegated authority to
Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the
armed forces-Congress's control over the men and money
ceases and is placed fully in the hands of the President." 6 With
the supplies requisite to protect the nation in his hands, the
President must be given the utmost discretion to employ them
effectively to accomplish the object of public safety. The con-
gressional check upon potential presidential encroachments is
antecedent to the President's exercise of the war power. It is
placed in the hands of Congress to curtail possible abuses of ex-
ecutive authority that impinge upon individual liberty.
The power of taxation is a powerful weapon against presi-
dential encroachments. Again, it must be remembered, though,
that the power must be exercised to fulfill the objects of the fed-
eral government. Congress has a duty to make certain that the
United States has sufficient funds to provide for the common
defense. Congress cannot use the taxing power as a weapon to
thwart the purposes of its taxing authority. It cannot, by failing
to collect taxes necessary for national security, obstruct the
President's obligation to defend the nation. The check, placed in
the hands of the legislature, against executive encroachments, is
aimed at protecting individual liberties.31 7 The President must
31 MADISON'S NOTEs, supra note 4, at 599 (Nathaniel Gorham). Congress also must
provide a military force before the Commander-in-Chief could conduct war. See notes
208-66 and accompanying text supra.
Cf. MADISON'S NoTs, supra note 4, at 334 (Edmund Randolph) ("Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the mili-
tary force, and in some respects the public money will be in his hands."). As 'noted,
however, the military might and its monetary support can never be under his control
unless placed there by Congress. See also id. at 599 ("the President he said would neces-
sarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war," (James Madison) but
"the means of carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of the
Legislature" (Nathaniel Gorham)).
31 One of the abuses of Parliament, of which the colonists complained in the Decla-
'p
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be given all resources necessary to secure public safety consis-
tent with republican safety. As the Supreme Court has held, "re-
sort to the taxing power to effectuate an end which is not legiti-
mate, not within the scope of the Constitution, is obviously
inadmissible."318
The Constitution invests Congress with certain war-related
powers that protect personal liberty. The legislature, though,
does not possess the public war power-the authority to secure
public safety. The Constitution separates the power of the sword
from that of the purse.
2. Common Defense and General Welfare
At the beginning of the Philadelphia Convention, Edmund
Randolph, presenting the Virginia Plan for the revision of the
form of the general government, set forth the first proposed
resolution:
Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected &
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;
namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."' 0O
This language was borrowed from the Articles of Confedera-
tion320 and formed the basis upon which the preamble to the
Constitution was conceived.32 1 While initially proposed at the
Convention, no power was granted to Congress generally to pro-
vide for the general welfare. Rather, its powers were enumerated
specifically.2 2
ration of Independence, was that of "imposing Taxes on us without our Consent." Under
the Constitution, the concurrence of both branches of the legislature and, absent an
override of his veto, of the President, is required to impose taxes upon the people.
3" United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69 (1935). Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US.
23, 29 (1968) ("Congress is granted broad power to 'lay and collect Taxes,' but the taxing
power, broad as it is, may not be invoked in such a way as to violate the privilege against
self-incrimination") (footnotes omitted).
3"' MADISON'S NoTs, supra note 4, at 30.
320 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I ("The said states hereby severally enter into
a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of
their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare ...
3-1 See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
3,2 See note 16 and accompanying text supra. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 292 (1936) ("The convention, however, declined to confer upon Congress
power in such general terms; instead of which it carefully limited the powers which it
thought wise to entrust to Congress by specifying them, thereby denying all others not
granted expressly or by necessary implication."); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Inde-
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The Framers not only limited the authority of the House of
Representatives to originate money bills to "[a] 11 Bills for raising
Revenue," 32 3 but also expressly defined which methods of raising
revenue would be permissible. In Section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, in the first clause, Congress is empowered "[t]o lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises. ' 324 The Fram-
ers, however, did not stop there. The legislature cannot constitu-
tionally raise revenue for any purpose whatsoever. The quoted
clause continues and requires that the revenue to be raised must
be "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.
3 25
These are the three purposes that limit Congress's power of
taxation.32 But these purposes cannot serve as pretexts for aug-
menting Congress's power.
The proposition ... that the power of the federal government inher-
ently extends to purposes affecting the nation as a whole with which
the states severally cannot deal or cannot adequately deal, and the
related notion that Congress, entirely apart from those powers dele-
gated by the Constitution, may enact laws to promote the general wel-
fare, have never been accepted but always definitively rejected by this
court. 2
pendence, 79 F.2d 32, 38 (10th Cir. 1935) (grant of power to Congress to provide for
general welfare rejected).
3's U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
324 Congress also has other such authority, an example of which is the power to
borrow money. See notes 332-45 and accompanying text infra.
... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 6
(Congress cannot "ascertain the sums and expences necessary for the defence and wel-
fare of the united states" without assent of nine states) (emphasis added); id. art. VIII
("All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for the common de-
fence or general welfare, and allowed by the united states in congress assembled, shall
be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states...
.") (emphasis added). Taxes traditionally were levied principally for the purpose of pro-
viding defense to the population. See, e.g., PUFENDORF, supra note 154, at 1279 ("taxes,
when levied in just measure and honestly expended, are nothing other than the price
paid by individuals to the state in return for the defence of their lives and property, and
to meet the expense involved therein").
326 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1935) (the "confines [of the taxing
power] are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of Sec. 8 which bestow and
define the legislative powers of Congress"); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Inde-
pendence, 79 F.2d 32, 41 (10th Cir. 1935) ("section 8 of article I gives Congress the power
of taxation and limits the purposes for which taxes may be levied and appropriated,
namely, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States").
121 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936). Accord THE FEDERALIST No.
41, supra note 5, at 268-69 (James Madison). See also Butler, 297 U.S. at 64 ("The view
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While the authority to tax is essential to carry out the func-
tions of the general government, that power must be limited to
those functions expressly set forth in the Constitution. Without
a limitation on the power of taxation, Congress would be able
constitutionally to take money from the people for any reason,
by originating and by passing a revenue raising bill. Therefore,
the authority is qualified to coincide with the objects of the fed-
eral government, as expressly set forth in the preamble to the
Constitution, to be fulfilled by the exercise of the powers subse-
quently enumerated or defined therein.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Butler, 2 held
that, while the taxing power is not unlimited, "its confines are
set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of Sec. 8
which bestow and define the legislative powers of the Con-
gress." 2 ' The Court adopted Justice Story's reasoning that the
only limitation on the power to tax is that the revenue be raised
for national, as distinguished from local, matters. 330 This, how-
ever, must mean those national concerns over which the Consti-
tution grants power to the federal government. Otherwise, the
legislature would be able to lay and collect taxes for purposes for
which the government could not spend. The boundaries that de-
fine the extent of the power of taxation are the financial needs
necessary to fulfill all of the powers of the federal government.
Other than the payment of debts, all of the fiscal requirements
of the federal government, are encompassed under the umbrella
phrase, "common defense and general welfare. ' 331
that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the
taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted."). Cf. United States v. Sanders,
99 F. Supp. 113, 117 (W.D. Okla. 1951) ("Congress possesses no general power to regu-
late for the promotion of the general welfare. It is limited in its powers to those which
are granted it by the Constitution, and these powers must be either expressly given, or
arise by necessary implication."), rev'd on other grounds, 196 F.2d-895 (10th Cir. 1952).
But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1975) (per curiam) (General Welfare Clause is
"a grant of power, the scope of which is quite expansive"); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 151 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting) (describing the clause to provide
"for the comknon defence and general welfare" as a substantive power).
328 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
9 Id. at 66.
10 See id. at 66-67. See also Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 79 F.2d at 41 ("We ... con-
clude that the phrase 'general welfare' is not limited by the specifically enumerated pow-
ers, but that the welfare must be national or general as contradistinguished from local or
special.").
1 Cf. Carter, 298 U.S. at 292 (The Convention "made no grant of authority to Con-
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3. Borrow Money
To raise revenue, Congress also is empowered "[t]o borrow
Money on the credit of the United States. ' 332 This power is de-
rived from the Articles of Confederation, which granted to the
Confederate Congress the power "to borrow money, or emit bills
on the credit of the united states, transmitting every half year to
the respective states an account on the sums of money so bor-
rowed or emitted."33 3 This power is essential to the national de-
fense.33 4 During the Revolutionary War, the Congress was forced
to borrow money from foreign nations to keep the war effort
alive and, consequently, became heavily indebted.3 5 To sink
such debts, Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes "to
pay the Debts" of the United States.336 This power correlates
with the express power "[t]o borrow money on the credit of the
United States."
Hamilton wrote that, "[i]n the modern system of war, na-
tions the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large
loans. 3 37 By placing the full power of taxation in the federal
government, the Constitution also enables the national govern-
ment to obtain credit more easily.
Foreigners, as well as citizens of America, could then reasonably re-
pose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government
that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the
means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly un-
derstood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with
in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with
the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.33 8
gress to legislate substantively for the general welfare, and no such authority exists, save
as the general welfare may be promoted by the exercise of the powers which are
granted.") (citation omitted).
332 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
"1 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 5. The Confederate Congress, however,
was prohibited from "borrow[ing] money on the credit of the united states" unless at
least nine states assented. Id. para. 6.
33, See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 5, at 267 (James Madison). ("The power
of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the
national defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it."). See also Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 48 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
131 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 30, supra note 5, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton);
MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 7 (preface); id. at 495 (Elbridge Gerry).
'3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
137 THE FEDERALIST No. 30, supra note 5, at 186 (Alexander Hamilton).
. Id. at 187.
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The power to borrow money is related integrally to the
power to tax. When money is borrowed on credit of the United
States, the personal wealth of each of its citizens is pledged.330
Thus, both powers, to tax and to borrow money, reside with
Congress. 4 0
The power to borrow money on credit had been exercised by
several colonies and by the Confederate Congress during the
Revolutionary War.
'3 [W]hat is the pledge which the public faith has pawned for the security of
these debts? The land, the trade, and the personal industry of the subject;
from which the money must arise that supplies the several taxes. In these
therefore, and these only the property of the public creditors does really and
intrinsically exist- and of course the land, the trade, and the personal industry
of individuals, are diminished in their true value just so much as they are
pledged to answer.... In short, the property of a creditor of the public consists
in a certain portion of the national taxes: by how much therefore he is the
richer, by so much the nation, which pays these taxes, is the poorer.
1 WiLLAM BLAcKToNm. CoMamirAPmms *327-28.
'0 It has been held that the power to borrow money "includes the power to issue, in
return for the money borrowed, the obligations of the United States in any appropriate
form, of stock, bonds, bills or notes." The Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421, 444 (1834).
But compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (power "[to borrow money on the credit of the
United States") with ARTICLEs oF CONFEDERATiON art. IX, para. 5 (power "to borrow
money, or emit bills on the credit of the united states") (emphasis added). See also Tim
FEDERALIST No. 44 at 290-91 (James Madison); MADISON'S NOTMs. supra note 4, at 471
n.* (striking power to emit bills of credit, "cut[ting] off the pretext for a paper cur-
rency"). The Court, in the Legal Tender Cases, thus held, apparently contrary to origi-
nal understanding, that, by these powers,
taken together, congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either
in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes,
as regards the national government or private individuals.
The power of making the notes of the United States a legal tender in pay-
ment of private debts, being included in the power to borrow money and to
provide a national currency, is not defeated or restricted by the fact that its
exercise may affect the value of private contracts.
The Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). This power to borrow, in
addition to its relationship to the taxing power, see notes 338-39 and accompanying text
supra, also, in the case of paper currency, nevertheless would directly implicate private
rights by this effect on private debts or contracts.
The power to borrow money is aimed, as well, at preventing a single state from
embroiling the nation in war:.
Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as
many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them
would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and
thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among
the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the
same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscre-
tion of a single member.
TnE FEDERALIsT No. 44, supra note 5, at 290-91 (James Madison).
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Whilst the paper emissions of Congress continued to circulate they
were employed as a sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that
ceased to be the case, the fatal defect of the political System [by
which the Congress was dependent upon the states for the collection
of taxes] was felt in its alarming force. The war was merely kept alive
and brought to a successful conclusion by such foreign aids and tem-
porary expedients as could be applied .... 3 1
This defect of dependence on the states was remedied in the
Constitution by vesting in Congress the powers of taxation and
of borrowing money on credit. These powers are essential for the
purpose of providing for the national defense.
Among the powers for funding a war granted to Congress
are the related powers "[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures 3 42 and "[t]o provide for the Punishment of coun-
terfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States."' 43 The power to borrow money on the credit of the
United States is connected integrally to the powers to coin
money and to tax, and each resides with Congress.34 4 Further-
more, the power to borrow money, like the powers to tax and
raise armies, is an indirect means of providing for the common
defense, which directly affects individual rights. While the Presi-
dent does have certain powers that operate upon the individual,
as, for instance, the authority to command the operations of the
armed forces, these powers operate to protect and defend the
nation. Thus, these powers serve to protect public rights and are
employed only after the legislature has made direct levies on the
people or on the states. 45 The executive's intrusions into per-
541 MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 7 (preface).
541 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
141 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. Among the powers denied to the states are the powers to
"coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; [or] pass any ... Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts." Id.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
The power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, also is
connected to the revenue raising power. See MADISON's NoTEs, supra note 4, at 118-19
(New Jersey Plan proposal that Congress "be authorized to pass acts for raising a reve-
nue... by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or
packages passing through the general post-office").
11 The power to coin money also directly affects private rights. See note 340 and
accompanying text supra.
.,. Cf. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) ("The
only power, therefore, which the president possesses, where the 'life, liberty or property'
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sonal rights, therefore, are only incidental. Congress is granted
those powers, essential to national security, that operate directly
upon the people and provide the means to secure public safety.
4. Power to Regulate Commerce
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the Constitution, empowers
Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." This is
one of the few powers granted by the Constitution that was not,
in any form, vested in the Confederate Congress, except with re-
spect to commerce with the Indians.a48
William Patterson, in his New Jersey Plan, proposed that
Congress "be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by
levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States.
.. [and] to pass Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as
well with foreign nations as with each other."34' The commerce
power is essential to the general power to raise revenue and is
yet another component of it. Roger Sherman listed the objects of
the federal government as these few:
of a private citizen is concerned, is the power and duty prescribed in the third section of
the second article, which requires 'that he shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully
executed.' "). The President, though, with regard to individual citizens, takes care that
laws first passed by Congress, affecting individual rights and duties, are executed
faithfully.
.. ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. IV ("the people of each state shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges
of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively .... P). The Confederate Congress was given the power
of "regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of
the states, provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not
infringed or violated." Id. art. IX, para. 4. By the Constitution, Congress was given the
power to regulate commerce 'with foreign nations, with the Indians, and among the
states. In no case was it given the power to manage affairs with foreign entities. To be
sure, the President is vested with the foreign affairs power. See U.S. CONs?. art. I, § 2,
cL 2. Accord United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(President has "plenary and exclusive power... as the sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations.. . ."); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186) ("As the executive head of the nation, the president is
made the only legitimate organ of the general government, to open and carry on corre-
spondence or negotiations with foreign nations, in matters concerning the interests of the
country or of its citizens. It is to him, also, the citizens abroad must look for protection
of person and of property .... [His duties] respect the nation, not individual rights...
.") (citation omitted).
"I MADISON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 118-19.
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1. defence agst. foreign danger. 2 agst. internal disputes & a resort to
force. 3. Treaties with foreign nations. 4 regulating foreign commerce,
& drawing revenue from it.34 8
James Madison wrote, in a similar vein:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce; with which the last the power of taxation will,
for the most part, be connected.3 4 9
As Hamilton explained it,
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in
a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the
celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these
objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and fa-
cilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury.50
Accordingly, Congress is granted the power to regulate foreign
commerce, and, incidentally, interstate commerce, as a means of
raising money for the operations of the general government, in-
cluding common defense.
It should be emphasized that Congress passes laws only for
internal regulation and does not have'the power, which is given
to the executive, to make treaties with foreign nations. 35 1 The
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations" is the power
to regulate the states', and the people's, behavior in transacting
business with the outside world. "For, as these are transactions
carried on between subjects of independent states, the municipal
3,8 Id. at 74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Rufus King thought that "[t]he
most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Natl. Legislature
were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue." Id. at 398 (Rufus King).
349 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 5, at'303 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
Cf. Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 19, 23 (1781) ("The national interest
of every commercial country requires, that some modeor criterion be adopted to ascer-
tain the ship, cargo, destination, property, and nation to which such ship belongs; not
only as a security for a fair commerce according to law; but as a guard against fraud and
imposition in the payment and collection of duties, imposts and commercial revenues.");
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *263-64 ("It is ... partly upon a fiscal founda-
tion, to secure his marine revenue, that the king has the prerogative of appointing ports
and havens, or such places only, for persons and merchandize to pass into and out of the
realm, as he in his wisdom sees proper.").
350 THE FEDERALIST No. 12, supra note 5, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton).
"' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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laws of one will not be regarded by the other.13 2
Individuals may engage in business transactions with citi-
zens of foreign nations. The President, on behalf of the United
States, may enter into compacts with other countries. The fed-
eral legislature's power goes only so far as to raise revenue for
the United States, while, through legislation, protecting the fair-
ness of trade, preventing one state, or a group of them, from
unfairly profiting at the expense of another.35 3 These are the ob-
jects of federal legislation in the nature of commercial regula-
tion. One object is to raise money; the other is to maintain fair-
ness in the system of trade. 354
While the power to regulate commerce belongs to Congress,
the foreign affairs power of the federal government-a part of
the more general authority to regulate intercourse with foreign
nations 55-- is vested in the President.356 This includes the treaty
352 1 WmLLmi BLAcK Nron, Co, ,r'r.uEs 0273.
3 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. L § 10, cl. 3. ("No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power .... '). To ensure fairness and harmony among the states, the commerce power
was vested in the federal legislature. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (19 Wheat.) 1,
224 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
3' When debating the power of origination of money bills, see notes 293.300 and
accompanying text supra, Madison said the following.
The word revenue was ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in the regulations
of trade, the object would be two-fold. The raising of revenue would be one of
them. How could it be determined which was the primary or predominant one;
or whether it was necessary that revenue shd. be the sole object, in exclusion
even of other incidental effects. When the Contest was first opened with G.B.
their power to regulate trade was admitted. Their power to raise revenue re-
jected. An accurate investigation of the subject afterward proved that no line
could be drawn between the two cases.
MADisON'S NoTEs, supra note 4, at 445-46. There also can be no doubt that
[t]he power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose
[of removing obstructions], and to the extent necessary, of all navigable waters
of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in
which they lie. For that purpose they are the public property of the nation,
and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress. This necessarily in-
cludes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their
navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions
when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper,
against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 566, 586 (1895) (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713, 724 (1865)). See also note 369 and accompanying text infra.
"' In The Federalist, Madison listed the powers, vested in the general government,
that
consist of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to
make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and
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power 357 and the power to appoint ambassadors and other public
ministers and consuls. These executive powers are not subject to
qualification by the entire Congress. The Senate alone, though,
to protect the interests of individual or groups of states, must
ratify treaties or appointments made by nomination of the
President 5s
consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, includ-
ing a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to
lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such
importations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 5, at 270 (James Madison). U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.
1, provides:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now ex-
isting shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty
may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
356 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also note 346 supra.
351 Later the first Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, wrote of the author-
ity to enter into treaties: "The power of making treaties is an important one, especially
as it relates to war, peace, and commerce ... " THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 5, at
417 (John Jay).
358 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. That the House is excluded, by the Constitution,
from foreign affairs does not mean that congressmen should not be familiar with it. Be-
cause of the commerce power, members of the House should familiarize themselves with
foreign policy.
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal repre-
sentative ... is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he
ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States
and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other na-
tions. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as
far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal
government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to
participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary
connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular
branches will and frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legis-
lation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and
cooperation.
THE FEDERALIST No. 53, supra note 5, at 351-52 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)
(emphasis added). While congressmen are expected to have knowledge of foreign affairs,
they need not have "[a]ccurate and comprehensive knowledge." Id. No. 75, at 488 (Alex-
ander Hamilton). The Senate participates in the treaty-making power; the House, along
with the Senate, must conform domestic legislation to ratified treaties. See THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 69, supra note 5, at 450-51 (Alexander Hamilton):
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur .... Every
jurist of [the British] kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Con-
stitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making treaties
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As these sections have shown, when personal rights are af-
fected directly, the power resides with Congress. The power of
the federal legislature to regulate commerce is internal only. It is
the authority to regulate the behavior of citizens or of individual
states. When a commercial agreement is struck between the
United States and a foreign nation, the exercise of power, which
incidentally may affect individual rights, is, according to our
Constitution, executive. Such compacts, made on behalf of the
whole country, can be accomplished only with the paramount
goal of promoting the public good, by preserving and protecting
the nation, by preventing hostility and animosity among nations,
and, by fostering friendship and economic and defensive cooper-
ation among them.
IV. THE POWER To DECLARE WAR AND OTHER RELATED PovRs
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the
war-related power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations 359 along with the war power, the authority "[t]o declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water." 360 These too are legis-
lative powers that regulate the behavior of citizens.
A. Offenses Against the Law of Nations
The authority to define and punish offenses against the law
exists in the crown in its utmost plentitude; and that the compacts entered
into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfec-
tion, independent of any other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is some-
times seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to
the stipulations in a new treaty;, and this may have possibly given birth to the
imagination, that its cooperation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the
treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause:
from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of reve-
nue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of
the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state
of things to keep the machine from running into disorder. In this respect,
therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President
and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what
the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.
(emphasis added and footnote omitted).
"' U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL 10.
361 Id. cl 11.
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of nations means the power to prescribe rules for the conduct of
U.S. citizens with respect to foreign individuals. The purpose of
the power is to prevent private persons (or individual states)
from embroiling the union in war with a foreign nation.
[W]here the individuals of any state violate this general law, it is then
the interest as well as duty of the government, under which they live,
to animadvert upon them-with a becoming severity, that the peace of
the world may be maintained. For in vain would nations in their col-
lective capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects were
at liberty to break them at their own discretion, and involve the two
states in a war.36 1
For that reason, "[i]t is of high importance to the peace of
America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these
powers."3 2 "The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to for-
eign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibil-
ity for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty
of preventing it."363
The law of nations "is the political law of each country con-
sidered in its relation to every other. 36 4 "Political law" is the
body of "laws relative to the governors and the governed." 3065 Of-
fenses against the law of nations, which regulate the conduct of
citizens, must be defined, because the law of nations is "often
too vague and deficient to be a rule. '3 66
One of the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation
was that it contained "no provision for the case of offences
against the law of nations; and consequently [left] it in the
power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy
with foreign nations. 3 6 7
361 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
311 THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 5, at 14 (John Jay).
"I Id. No. 80, supra note 5, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton).
3" MONTESQUIEU, supra note 30, at 190.
35' Id. at 103.
..6 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 637 (Gouverneur Morris). Cf. THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (King has given assent to acts of pretended
legislation "[flor transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses").
117 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 5, at 272 (James Madison). Cf. MADISON'S
NOTES, supra note 4, at 142 (James Madison) (New Jersey Plan proposed at the outset
of Convention would not "prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars.... The existing
Confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to
it does not supply the omission."). The power to prevent violations of treaties may be
found in the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. Cf. note 358 supra.
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The principal offenses against the law of nations, animadverted on as
such by the municipal laws of England, are of three kinds; 1. Violation
of safe-conducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and, 3.
Piracy." '
Violations of safe-conduct
are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which
there can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and an-
other: and such offenses may, according to the writers upon the law of
nations, be a just ground of a national war; since it is not in the power
of the foreign prince to cause justice to be done to his subjects by the
very individual delinquent, but he must require it of the whole
community.36
To prevent war with foreign nations, immunities of ambassadors
and of other public ministers are protected by civil laws. 7 0 Am-
bassador immunity, safe conduct, and piracy "are the principal
cases, in which the statute law of England interposes, to aid and
enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common law; by in-
flicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that uni-
versal law, committed by private persons."371
B. Piracy
The crime of piracy, at the time of the Philadelphia Con-
vention, had an accepted meaning of robbery on the high seas.
Statutory laws, however, occasionally expanded its definition.
The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in committing those
acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if commit-
ted upon land, would have amounted to felony there. But, by statute,
some other offences are made piracy also .... 37
Accordingly, the Constitution gives Congress the power to define
368 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CONMmNTARI.S *68. Accord Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 US.
1003 (1985).
4 Wn.uLw BLACKSTONE, CotE.NTAiFs *68-69. See notes 354, 361, 363, 367 and
accompanying text supra.
370 See, e.g., 4 WnL.AM BLACKSTONE, CotsurrNTAns '70, "256; GRonus, supra note
159, at 207.
371 4 WILIAMA BLACKSTONE, CotniENTARms *73 (emphasis added).
372 4 id. at *72. See also Dole v. Merchants' Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 468
(1863) (piracy is robbery on the high seas); GRomus, supra note 159, at 169 (piracy is
robbery); VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 98 ("those who rob on land or sea with-
out the authorization of any sovereign, we call pirates and brigands").
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and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas
that might involve the nation in war.
The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and
felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the
trial of these offences. The definition of piracies might ... be left to
the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in
most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evi-
dently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the
common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of
that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or
of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this,
unless previously made its own by legislative adoption.3 7 3
Punishment of individuals for such acts, by the civil authority of
the nation, is another method by which the Constitution dis-
courages the invitation of war.
C. The Declaration of War Clause
The war power of Congress, under the Constitution, consists
only of the power to declare war, a very limited authority, and
the related, publicly authorized, private war power to grant let-
ters of marque and reprisal. While the power to declare war was
included within the war power of the Confederate Congress, it
was only an incidental power under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. It was not enumerated expressly. The authority of the Con-
federate Congress nominally was the same as that of the British
monarch. It was rendered ineffective, however, because, for its
exercise, it required the assent of at least nine states.7 4 Under
the Constitution, most of the war power is vested in the execu-
tive. The relatively insignificant power to declare war was left to
the legislative body, to secure republican liberty. Congress also is
invested with the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.
This authority, which existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, was expanded under the Constitution.
373 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 5, at 272 (James Madison). Under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, art. IX, para. 1, the Confederate Congress had the power of "ap-
pointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and
establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures."
374 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 6.
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1. Letters of Marque and Reprisal
Letters of marque and reprisal are commissions from the
sovereign authority of the state, allowing citizens to seize the
persons or goods of foreign subjects. Under Article IX of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, the Confederate Congress possessed "the
sole and exclusive right and power.., of granting letters of mar-
que and reprisal in times of peace." 375 Under the Constitution,
only Congress may grant such commissions and may do so at
any time.3 7 6
Under the British model, letters of marque and reprisal
were issued by ministers of the crownY.3  "[T]he prerogative of
granting" such commissions "is nearly related to, and plainly de-
rived from, that other of making war; this being indeed only an
incomplete state of hostilities, and generally ending in a formal
denunciation of war."378 As Van Bynkershoek points out, this
practice
belongs to public law, not only because privateering requires public
authorization, but also because controversies that arise out of it fre-
quently disturb states and bring them into conflict... Princes have
now, for a very long time, employed the resources of individuals in
addition to their public resources against their enemies.D
Under our system, only Congress can decide whether to employ
the resources of individuals. It may make requisitions on indi-
viduals, conscripting them into public service or applying a por-
tion of their property to public use. While the President com-
mands the men and money that comprise the "public resources"
375 Id. para. 1. The power was constrained by the requirement of the assent of nine
states. Id. para. 6.
"' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cL 1.
37 1 W-LLmI BLAcKroNE, CohmitrTA ius *258.
" 1 id. See also Barron v. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243, 249 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (states are forbidden "[t]o grant letters of marque and
reprisal, [as such] would lead directly to war; the power of declaring which is expressly
given to Congress"); GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 311 (in addition to declaration of war,
"[a]nother method of obtaining redress for any violation of persons, or property is by
having recourse to what, in modern language, are called REPRISALS, which the Saxons
and Angles denominated WITHERNAM, and to which the French gave the name of
LETTERS OF MARQUE, and those were usually obtained from the crown"). Late in
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, a proposal was made to add a power
to grant letters of marque and reprisal. Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, "thought [it) not
included in the power of war." MADIsON's NoTrS, supra note 4, at 478.
1' VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 104 (emphasis added).
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of the nation once gathered by Congress, Congress may author-
ize private acts of war wholly separate from the President's use
of U.S. armed forces.
The legislative determination on whether to grant letters of
marque and reprisal in times of peace concerns injuries to pri-
vate citizens by individuals of nations with which we are at
peace.
It is a matter beyond all doubt that the liberty of private redress,
which once existed, was greatly abridged after courts of justice were
established. Yet there may be cases, in which private redress must be
allowed.380
Letters of marque and reprisal are an example of this exception
to the general rule of abridgment of private redress.
These letters are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the sub-
ject of one state are oppressed and injured by those of another; and
justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor belongs. In this
case letters of marque and reprisal ... may be obtained, in order to
seize the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state, until
satisfaction be made, wherever they happen to be found.. . . But here
the necessity is obvious of calling in the sovereign power, to determine
when reprisals may be made; else every private sufferer would be a
judge in his own cause.381
"Thus letters of marque and reprisal, by which individuals are
enabled to redress their own wrongs, must issue from the sover-
eign power, otherwise the hostilities of such individuals would be
unlawful. 3 8 2 Without "a commission as a privateer," if an indi-
vidual engages in such hostilities, he would be a pirate or a rob-
ber. 83 As the guardian of private liberty, Congress determines
110 GRoTIus, supra note 159, at 56.
8' 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258-59 (emphasis added and footnotes
omitted). See also BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 134 ("The denial of justice is there-
fore usually met by the issuance of letters of reprisal, and through them we receive from
the government the license to seize the persons and goods of others, on account of the
violence or injustice previously done the subjects of the government, if restitution for the
injustice has been denied. Thus an injury done by force and not rectified by the courts is
repaired by force.").
"I GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 278 n.*.
'13 VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 102. Accord 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIS *257 ("Such unauthorized volunteers in violence are not ranked among open
enemies, but are treated like pirates and robbers"). See also Dole v. Merchants' Mut.
Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 470 (1863):
Because the officbrs and crew of the Sumter acted under commissions issued,
by a de facto government, engaged in levying war against the United States, it
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whether letters of marque and reprisal ought to be granted.
2. The Power To Declare War
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Confederate Con-
gress possessed "the sole and exclusive right and power of deter-
mining on peace and war. '384 Indeed, this authority is commen-
surate with that of the Framers' model of executive power, the
British monarch who had "the sole prerogative of making war
and peace. ' ' 31 The Constitution hardly vests this extraordinary
power in the Congress of the United States.
Under the Constitution, the powers to declare war and to
grant letters of marque and reprisal are vested in Congress. The
rest of the war-making power was conferred upon the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The President also is invested with the power
to make peace, in which, because it includes the treaty-making
power, the Senate participates. An oversimplification of the dis-
tinction between the war powers of the legislature and of the
executive is this: The Commander-in-Chief has the power to
turn a state of war into a state of peace; Congress has the power
to change a state of peace into a state of war. This is true.38 0
But, the power to declare war, for example, involves more than
commencing war.387 A more complete characterization of the di-
is said that they were not pirates, but enemies.
That they were liable to be regarded as "enemies," is undoubtedly true.
This implies the existence of "war." But every forcible contest between two
governments, de facto, or de jure, is war. War is an existing fact, and not a
legislative decree. Congress alone may have power to "declare" it beforehand,
and thus cause or commence it. But it may be initiated by other nations, or by
traitors; and then it exists, whether there is any declaration of it or not. It may
be prosecuted without any declaration; or Congress may, as in the Mexican
war, declare its previous existence. In either case it is the fact that make "en-
emies," and not any legislative Act.
If American citizens are injured by the sovereign authority of a foreign state, and
not by individual foreigners, the public interest is implicated. The President possessing
the public war authority, protects and defends the nation against such enemies, cf. note
428 and accompanying text infra, though Congress still in that case may authorize pri-
vate citizens to commit acts of war.
Art. IX, para. 1.
1 VILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES 0257.
',' See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 698 (1862) (Nelson, J., dissent-
ing) (The power to "change the country and all its citizens from a state of peace to a
state of war... belongs exclusively to the Congress .... ).
Indeed, initiating hostilities does not comport with the principles upon which
this nation was founded, unless hostilities are begun to secure rights of individual Ameri-
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vision of the war power is this: The President protects public
liberty; Congress protects private or republican liberty. Accord-
ingly, the President possesses the public war power through use
of U.S. armed forces; Congress possesses the publicly authorized,
private war power.
The power to make war is ambiguous388 and encompasses
numerous powers.389 The Constitution does not empower Con-
gress to make war, to wage war, to engage in war, to levy war, or
even to authorize war. It vests in the legislature what was, even
in 1787, only a formal power-simply a ceremonial announce-
ment-that was in disuse.390 It, however, does have significance,
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Confederate Con-
gress, in theory holding the power to make war, could not "en-
gage in a war... unless nine states assent to the same." ' The
most conspicuous defect of the confederation, thus, was that the
Confederate Congress was not "permitted to prevent war nor to
support it by their own authority. 3 92 The power to declare war,
however, which clearly is incidental to the power to make war,'93
was established in the confederation "in the most ample
form."394 If the Confederate Congress were fettered from sup-
porting or from preventing war by its own authority, even
though the power to declare war was established "in the most
ample form," that authority could not be the expansive war
power that proponents of a congressional public war-making au-
thority suggest.
can citizens, see notes 396-97, 428 infra.
"' See note 208 and accompanying text supra; notes 423-35 and accompanying text
infra.
389 Cf. M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS Bk III, ch. I, § 4, at
357 (Massachusetts, Simeon Butler 1820) ("the sovereign power has alone authority to
make war. But as the different rights which constitute this power, originally resident in
the body of the nation, may be separated or limited according to the will of the nation..
we are to seek the power of making war in the particular constitution of each state").
"I "The ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse."
THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 5, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton). See note 422 and
accompanying text infra.
"" Art. IX, para. 6.
392 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 29 (Edmund Randolph).
See notes 384, 389 and accompanying text supra; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
art. VI (States retained authority to grant letters of marque and reprisal only "after a
declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled ... ").
"I THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 5, at 261 (James Madison).
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There is an external function of a declaration, or denuncia-
tion, of war. It is "a public renunciation of friendship." 35 It
serves, thus, to begin a war, by the public authority of a nation,
to redress injuries caused and to secure against future aggres-
sions by individual foreigners. Blackstone stated this:
[The reason which is given by Grotius, why according to the law of
nations a denunciation of war ought always to precede the actual com-
mencement of hostilities, is not so much that the enemy may be put
upon his guard, (which is matter rather of magnanimity than right)
but that it may be certainly clear that the war is not undertaken by
private persons, but by the will of the whole community .... S
It is an announcement, prior to hostilities, that war is being con-
ducted under the public authority of the state and is not a pri-
vate undertaking.
A declaration of war, as Judge Blackstone explained, also is
necessary, by the customary law of nations of some states, for
the declaring nation to give peculiar rights and impose certain
duties on its citizens. "[T]o make a war completely effectual, it
is necessary with us in England that it be publicly declared and
395 VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 18.
*11 1 WmLLui BLACKSTONE, CommzNrARmIEs *258 (footnotes omitted). It is notewor-
thy that Blackstone, when speaking of the announcement to the enemy, uses the term,
"denunciation of war." War is "publicly declared" to citizens within the nation; the noti-
fication to a foreign nation that, thus, becomes an enemy, commonly is called a "denun-
ciation." Id. See VATTEL, supra note 389, Bk M, ch. IV, §§ 63-64, at 384-85; note 422 and
accompanying text infra. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)
("[Olur British brethren ... too have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity.
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and
hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.") (empha-
sis added); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45 (1800) (Chase, J.) ("The acts of congres
have been analysed to show, that a war is not openly denounced against France ..... ).
Blackstone asserts that "impeachment, for improper or inglorious conduct, in begin-
ning, conducting, or concluding a national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the
ministers of the crown." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CommENTArs *258. Under our Consti-
tution, the impeachment check may be used to restrain the President from improperly
conducting or concluding a national war. As a further precaution at one end, the Senate
has the power to ratify treaties of peace. At the other, republican safety is secured by
Congress's power to declare war. Only Congress may initiate an offensive war. See notes
414, 418 and accompanying text infra. In our republic, this means that only by authority
of the legislature may this nation commence war to assert publicly the private rights of
citizens. Cf. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850) ("the genius and character
of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon
Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general
government to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the
rights of its citizens").
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duly proclaimed by the king's authority; and, then, all parts of
both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are
bound by it."' s 7
Hugo Grotius, upon whom Blackstone relied, explained
that certain formalities, attending war, were introduced by the law of
nations, which formalities were necessary to secure the peculiar privi-
leges arising out of the law. From hence a distinction, which there will
be occasion to use hereafter, between a war with the usual formalities
of the law of nations, which is called just or perfect, and an informal
war, which does not for that reason cease to be just, or agreeable to
right.3 '
The formality of a declaration of war, as explained below, which
operates on the citizens of the declaring state,3 99 has given rise
to a distinction between a just or perfect war and an informal
(or less formal) war. A "just" or formal war, however, which is
declared, is not more just, in a real sense, than an undeclared
war.
"The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three,
defence, indemnity, and punishment. '40 0 A declaration of war is
necessary only when, instead of commissioning privateers, the
sovereign power directs all citizens to go to war to indemnify
personal injuries suffered by individuals. It is clear that "[to re-
pel force, or to punish a delinquent, the law of nature requires
397 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258 (emphasis added). Obviously, when
Blackstone says that it binds all citizens on both sides, he means only that each of a
declaring state's subjects will be obligated to wage war against all those of the contend-
ing nation. Cf. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 30 (In a formal declaration, "every
man is ordered to attack the subjects of the hostile prince, to seize their goods, and to do
them all possible harm."); id. at 120-21 ("in every declaration of war every man is asked
to do as much damage to the enemy as he can"); GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 327
("whenever... war is declared against any power, it is at the same time declared against
all the subjects of that power").
398 GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 36 (emphasis added).
3"' See, e.g., VArrEL, supra note 389, Bk. III, ch. IV, § 56, at 382-83:
[I]t is necessary for a nation to publish the declaration of war for the instruc-
tion and direction of its own subjects, in order to fix the date of the rights
belonging to them from the moment of this declaration, and relatively to cer-
tain effects which the voluntary law of nations attributes to a war in form.
Without such a public declaration of war, it would be difficult to settle, in a
treaty of peace, those acts which are to be accounted the effects of the war, and
those which each nation may consider as wrongs, for obtaining reparation.
400 GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 75. "[W]here intention has proceeded to any out-
ward and visible signs of insatiable ambition and injustice, it is deemed a proper object
of jealousy, and even of punishment." Id. at 246.
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no declaration."'4 ' Such force need not be a "sudden attack"
but, rather, any force.402 Furthermore, those possessed of au-
thority to punish acts of aggression "have a right to exact pun-
ishment not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves
or their own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of na-
ture and of nations, done to other states and subjects."40 3
Though a declaration of war may not be necessary to punish
an aggressor or to repel force, it is required in all cases to confer
certain rights and to impose certain obligations upon
individuals.
[To make a war just, according to this meaning, it must not only be
carried on by the sovereign authority on both sides, but it must also
be duly and formally declared, and declared in such a manner, as to
be known to each of the belligerent powers.'"
401 Id. at 317. Cf. VATrEL, supra note 389, Bk. III, ch. IV, § 57, at 383 ("He who is
attacked and makes only a defensive war, need not declare it, the state of war being
sufficiently determined by the declaration of the enemy, or his open hostilitie.').
402 See notes 424-27 and accompanying text supra. "[Tihe extortion of debts
through illegal means," for example, "constitutes 'force' as defined by law quite as much
as the infliction of wounds." VAN BYNKERSHOFK, supra note 154, at 15. "[AIl lav permit
the repelling of force by force" without a declaration of war. Id. at 21. Cf. United States
v. Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 848 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5126) ("[W]ar may be sufficiently
levied against the United States, although no violence be used, and although no battle be
fought. It is not necessary that actual violence should take place, to prove the actual
waging of war.").
4o GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 247 (emphasis added). For collective self-defense,
nations have a right to repel force and need not wait for the delinquent state to attack.
See also VATrE[, supra note 389, Bk. III, ch. III, § 49, at 379:
[I]f this prince makes an unjust war, every one has a right to succour the op-
pressed....
In fine, should this formidable power plainly entertain designs of oppres-
sion and conquest, should it betray its views by preparative or other motions,
the neighboring nations have an unquestionable right to prevent it. And if the
fate of war declares on their side, a farther right to make use of this happy
opportunity for weakening and reducing a power too contrary to the equilib-
rium, and dangerous to the common liberty.
This right of nations is still more evident against a sovereign, who from a
precipitate order of running to arms without reasons, or even so much as plau-
sible pretences, is continually disturbing the public tranquillity.
404 GROTtIS, supra note 159, at 317. Cf. PUFENDoRF, supra note 154, at 1300 ("A
common distinction is drawn between war that is formal and one that is less formal. The
former requires that it be conducted on each side by the authority of the supreme sover-
eignty of a state, and that proper notice be given of its opening, while the designation
less formal is given to such a war as is not proclaimed, or which is waged against private
citizens."). Pufendorf wrote that Grotius provides "all the necessary information" on a
"declaration required for a formal war." Id. at 1307.
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In other words,
to obtain the peculiar rights and consequences resulting from the law
of nations, a declaration of war by one of the parties, at least, if not
by both, is absolutely requisite in all cases.40
As Blackstone repeated, the reason for a denunciation of
war, according to Grotius, is not "to prevent every appearance of
clandestine and treacherous dealing: an openness, which may be
dignified with the name of magnanimity, rather than entitled a
matter of right. ' 406 Rather,
a more satisfactory reason may be found in the necessity that it
should be known for CERTAIN, that a war is not the PRIVATE un-
dertaking of BOLD ADVENTURERS, but made and sanctioned by
the PUBLIC and SOVEREIGN authority on both sides; so that it is
attended with the effects of binding all the subjects of the respective
states;-and it is accompanied also with other consequences and
rights, which do not belong to wars against pirates, and to civil
wars."
07
105 GROTIUS, supra note 159, at 318 (emphasis added). See also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 37. 40-41 (1800) (Washington, J.):
It may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by force between
two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective gov-
ernments, is not only war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is called
solemn, and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with
another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war, are
authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every
place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under
a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their
condition.
But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its na-
ture and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and this is
more properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and because those
who are authorised to commit hostilities, act under special authority, and can
go no farther than to the extent of their commission. Still, however, it is public
war, because it is an external contention by force, between some of the mem-
bers of the two nations, authorised by the legitimate powers. It is a war be-
tween the two nations, though all the members are not authorised to commit
hostilities such as in a solemn war, where the government restrain the general
power.
Congress, by the Constitution, can authorize hostilities in two ways; each authorizes
individuals to commit acts of war. It may declare war, authorizing all citizens to commit
acts of war, or it may grant letters of marque and reprisal to certain individuals. Cf. id.
at 43 (Chase, J.) ("Congress has not declared war in general terms; but congress has
authorised hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases").
106 GRoTius, supra note 159, at 321.
407 Id.
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Thus, while the law of nature requires no declaration of war to
repel force,
it is no less necessary to shew by way of vindication that it is a defen-
sive war, and at the same time by public declaration to give it the
character of a national and lawful war, in order to establish those
rights and consequences
4
"
3
according to the law of nations.
An example of such rights and consequences concerns cap-
tures. The type of war has an impact on whether captures are
lawful prizes.40 9 Because captures are related integrally to a dec-
laration of war and to letters of marque and reprisal, Congress is
granted the power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water" in the same clause by which it is empowered to de-
clare war and to grant letters of marque and reprisal.410 This
48 Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
409 See id. at 321-22. Cf. id. at 200 ("For any thing given up to pirates or robbers,
through fear, is no lawful prize: but it may be recovered, unless a solemn oath of renunci-
ation has been taken. This is not the case with the captures made in just war."). Con-
gress may confer numerous rights and impose many obligations on citizens in war. For
example, commercial intercourse between enemies generally ceases during war. Thus,
Congress may confer certain rights or impose duties relating to commercial intercourse.
See VANBYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 29. "[W]hile contracts made during war be-
tween alien enemies are absolutely void, being against public policy, private interests are
protected, and bona fide contracts made before the breaking out of the war are sus-
pended during its continuance, but revive at its termination." Jackson Ins. Co. v. Stew-
art, 13 F. Cas. 259, 259 (C.C.D. Md. 1866) (No. 7152). Further examples of the many
rights and consequences that may be provided for by a declaration of war would be the
right of postliminium-that to which a returning prisoner of war would be entitled-or
the treatment of neutral neighbors of those with whom we are at war. See GROTIus,
supra note 159, at 351, 377.
410 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See also PUENDORP, supra note 154, at 1310-
11:
The question is also raised, to whom the things acquired in a formal war be-
long;, whether to the whole people, or to individuals among the people, or to
those who were the first to acquire them. This, we feel, can be answered in a
few words. Now it is certain that the right of war, under which is compre-
hended the right to arm citizens, and to lead them out into the field, as well as
the right to levy upon them money, or whatever is needful for war, is vested in
the supreme sovereignty. But since wars are undertaken either to assert the
private debts of individuals, which an enemy wilfully refuses to pay, or for
some reason which concerns the whole commonwealth, it is clearly to be seen,
that in the first case, the prime point to be held in mind is that those, for
whose sake the war is waged, should receive what is owed them. What is taken
over and above such debts, and in wars undertaken for reasons of the state,
whosoever it be that first acquires it ... belongs to the author of the war,
which is the supreme sovereignty... But since the burden of war lies heavy
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power is not limited to captures made pursuant to a declaration
of war or to a letter of marque and reprisal.
As discussed above, the power to grant letters of marque
and reprisal is closely related to the authority to declare war.411
When citizens of a nation are injured by those of another, and
redress is denied by the foreign government, the sovereign power
of the state determines whether to grant its injured a commis-
sion privately, but upon public authority, to seize the bodies and
belongings of the offending state's subjects. 412 The arm of the
government in which resides the powers to grant letters of mar-
que and reprisal (which often result in a formal declaration of
war413) and to declare war must determine whether to allow pri-
vate individuals to commit acts of violence to obtain satisfaction
by captures. It also determines whether injuries suffered by indi-
viduals at the hands of subjects of another nation justifies bind-
ing all citizens in war. "[I]t is only proper for the heads of states
to go to war for individual citizens, if it can be done without
entailing a greater hardship upon all or a majority of the other
upon individual citizens, whether they are called upon for taxes, or for mili-
tary service, it is both right and humane on the part of him in whom resides
the supreme sovereignty, to make it possible for individual citizens to derive
some profit from a war. Now, this is possible in several ways: If citizens who
participate in a war may receive some salary from the public treasury... or if
all share in the booty, or every soldier be allowed to keep what he has seized
(this we are told by Polybius, Bk. IV, chaps. XXVI, XXXVI, that when a
Greek state declared war it "gave public announcement of the booty," that is, a
crier announced it to be the will of the state that every man could take booty);
or if the booty is appropriated by the state treasury for future use, to be em-
ployed in decreasing the burdens and taxes of the citizens.... But when [Gro-
tius] distinguishes between public and private acts of war, of which the latter
are only undertaken upon occasion of a public war, it is to be observed that it
is questionable whether everything that is taken in war by private acts and on
the unbidden initiative of individuals, can belong to those who take it. For it is
a part of the right of war to stipulate what persons can injure an enemy, and
how far they may proceed. And so private individuals will not be permitted to
make booty of an enemy's property, or take off any of his possessions, without
permission from the supreme sovereignty, whose province it is to decide how
far private individuals should exercise that license of plunder, and whether
all the booty or only a part should be allowed to them. And so whatever be-
longs to private citizens in a war, depends entirely upon the indulgence of
the supreme sovereignty, or, in other words, the state alone authorizes a man
to be a soldier and allows him to commit the acts of offensive war.
(emphasis added).
,x See note 378 and accompanying text supra.
412 See note 381 and accompanying text supra.
4" See note 378 and accompanying text supra.
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citizens, since their duty is more concerned with the whole body
of citizens than with a part, and the greater the part the more
closely it approximates the whole."'1 4 Under our Constitution,
there can be no declaration without representation.
Cornelius Van Bynkershoek agreed with Grotius "that the
law of nature does not require a declaration of war.' 1  He dis-
agreed with Grotius, however, that a denunciation of war is nec-
essary to notify the enemy that war is being waged by the public
authority of the state.4 " Rather, Van Bynkershoek considered
"a declaration of war as an act of mere humanity, which no one
can be compelled to perform.' 417
[A] declaration is not demanded by any exigency of reason... while it
is a thing which may properly be done, it cannot be required as a
matter of right. War may begin by a declaration, but it may also begin
by mutual hostilities.... [N]ations and princes endowed with some
pride are not generally willing to wage war without a previous declara-
tion, for they wish by an open attack to render victory more
honourable and glorious. But here I must repeat the distinction be-
tween generosity and justice.... The latter permits the use of force
without a declaration of war, the former considers everything in a
nobler manner, deems it far from glorious to overcome an unarmed
and unprepared enemy, and considers it base to attack those who may
have come to us in reliance upon public amity and to despoil them
when such amity has suddenly been broken through no fault of
theirs.4 1
Thus, a denunciation of war is a "public renunciation of friend-
ship.""'9 When there is no state of amity between nations, even
"I PuENDoR, supra note 154, at 1305-06. See also GRorus, supra note 159, at 285.
45 VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 18. See also id. ("where, as in the case of
different sovereigns, no courts have jurisdiction, each one may properly seize the prop-
erty which another has wrongly taken and refused to restore. If this be true, every one is
at liberty to make or to withhold the declaration, otherwise a declaration is a certain
solemn form that could only have been introduced by an agreement between nations--a
thing which does not exist").
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Cf. id. at 21 ("Certainly the mutual use of force may
properly begin a war, not to mention other cases which may fall into this class, and
which according to the jurists do not require a previous declaration."). Cf. MADIsoN's
NoTEs, supra note 4, at 138 (under Hamilton's plan, proposed at the Convention, the
Senate would "have the sole power of declaring war," and the executive would "have the
direction of war when authorized or begun") (emphasis added); VATrrL, supra note 389,
Bk. IT, ch. IV, § 57, at 383 (warfare is established by declaration or open hostilities).
41" VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 18.
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generosity (that would compel the sovereign to announce war to
a foreign nation before attacking its "unarmed and unprepared
army") would not require that kind of formal "declaration."
The disagreement between Van Bynkershoek and Grotius
arises from the reliance by Grotius on European customs. This
distinction between customs and the law of nations was recog-
nized by Blackstone: "[T]o make war completely effectual, it is
necessary with us in England that it be publicly declared. '4
20
Moreover, Van Bynkershoek noted that Grotius, who
himself teaches us that customs do not constitute the law of nations
... as in this case, so also in others... has frequently deduced the
law of nations from customs, and consequently when customs differ he
has hardly dared to decide the question.... Indeed, with the excep-
tion of [the Achaeans and the Romans], the custom of declaring war
was not frequently observed among the ancients.... Even now, as far
as I can discover, European nations are the only ones that make for-
mal declarations of war, and even these do not all do so nor at all
times.... Reason... is ... the soul of the law of nations, and if we
refer to reason, we shall find no argument to support the need of a
declaration, but many.., to the contrary.2 1
In 1788, Alexander Hamilton acknowledged that this "ceremony
of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse,"422
apparently even in Europe.
This was the Framers' understanding of the power to de-
clare war. A draft of the Constitution provided that the legisla-
ture have power "[t]o make war."423 The debate on this provi-
sion often is cited by both those who believe that the power to
declare war is an expansive war-making authority as well as by
those who (quite correctly) comprehend that it is a narrow one.
420 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258 (emphasis added).
421 VAN BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 154, at 20-21.
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 5, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, he argued, Congress must be permitted to raise armies in time of
peace. Otherwise,
the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal
warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the
State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All
that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the
gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of
a free government.
Id. War may be commenced by a denunciation of war, but it more commonly is begun by
force; often by distant force.
423 MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 389.
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Those who advocate broad congressional war-making power
seize upon an isolated, unfortunately phrased clause from the
decidedly unclear debate-that the substitution of "declare" for
"make" leaves "to the Executive the power to repel sudden at-
tacks. '424 To be sure, as demonstrated long ago,4 25 the Constitu-
tion does not restrict the President's war power to the scope of
that of the states. The states may not "engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay. ' 428 In contrast, the Commander-in-Chief may defend
against remote aggression. 27
Viewed in its full context, nevertheless, the debate that re-
sulted in "declare" for "make" does establish that, as an exami-
nation of the Articles of Confederation and early authorities on
war illustrate, "declare" is much more narrow than "make" and
that "declare" is a simple announcement that may be used to
commence offensive war. The debate also establishes that the
President is left with the power to repel force. In sum, by leav-
ing with the executive the power to turn a state of war into a
state of peace, peace-brought about by war, diplomacy, or trea-
ties-is facilitated. War, the Framers explained, is clogged, by
placing the power to declare war in the legislative branch. (By
this, the Founding Fathers could not have meant acts of another
nation amounting to war, over which we have no control, but
only war begun by the United States.42 )
The following is the controversial debate from the Constitu-
tional Convention, divided up by commentary.
"To make war."
MR. PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legisla-
ture. Its proceedings were too slow. It [would] meet but once a year.
The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. The
Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with for-
eign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are
424 Id. at 476 (emphasis added). See note 430 and accompanying text infra.
" I now mean "long ago in this article." See notes 156-60 and accompanying text
supra.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
41 See notes 155-60 and accompanying text supra.
'8 An offensive war, on the part of the United States, may be begun against a for-
eign nation to redress injuries suffered by American citizens at the hands of subjects of
other states; that is, by pirates or robbers. The use of military force against an enemy is
public war, though Congress also may authorize private hostilities against the enemy.
See note 383 and accompanying text supra.
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equally represented in Senate, so as to give no advantage to large
States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their
all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singu-
lar for one authority to make war, and another peace.
MR. BUTLER. The objections [against] the Legislature lie in
great degree [against] the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the
President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make
war but when the Nation will support it.429
The first of these two gentlemen from South Carolina wanted
the Senate to "make" war. The second thought that the Senate
would be as incompetent as Congress to be trusted with this
power. He was for vesting it in the President. Apparently to
clarify the nature of the power to be conferred upon Congress,
MR. MADISON and MR. GERRY moved to insert "declare," striking
out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks.
43 0
One of the Connecticut delegates, Roger Sherman, understood
that "declare" was more narrow than "make" but, for some
reason,
thought it stood very well. The Executive [should] be able to repel
and not to commence war. "Make" better than "declare" the latter
narrowing the power too much.4 3 1
This apparently discombobulated one of the proponents of the
motion to substitute "declare" for "make." He now believed that
there was a motion to give the power to declare war to the
President:
MR. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion to em-
power the Executive alone to declare war.
4 3
2
Because a declaration of war confers rights and imposes duties
on citizens, it would be inconsistent for the executive power of a
republic to possess this power. Another delegate from Connecti-
cut, Oliver Ellsworth, explained that
there is a material difference between the cases of making war and
making peace. It [should] be more easy to get out of war, than into it.
War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended with intri-
"" MADISON's NOTS, supra note 4, at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
430 Id. at 476.
431 Id.
432 Id.
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cate & secret negociations.
MR. MASON was [against] giving the power of war to the Execu-
tive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because
not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather
than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "de-
clare" to "make."'
3
Our nation cannot control the commencement of war by an-
other. To facilitate peace, the power to meet the challenge of
war, to "protect and defend" the United States, rests with the
President. To clog commencement of war by our nation, the nar-
row power to declare war-but not the ambiguous authority to
"make" war-is vested in Congress.
On the motion to insert declare-in place of make, it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no. Pa. ay. DeL ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C.
ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay.'
3
4
When Rufus King remarked that "make" war might be under-
stood as "conduct" war, an executive function, some of the be-
wilderment may have dissipated, and the vote of Connecticut
was changed to "ay. '4 35
This otherwise confusing exchange suggests that the Fram-
ers understood that the power to declare war is a very narrow
authority. The Framers opted in favor of denying Congress the
power to make war. Instead, the Constitution grants the legisla-
tive branch only the limited authority to declare war. Congress
initiates offensive wars to secure private rights4, 3 and, in any
war, may confer peculiar rights upon and cause certain conse-
quences to befall the citizens of the United States. Otherwise,
the war power (subject to the constitutional checks on the exec-
utive's ability to originate the means of war) resides in the
President.
Hamilton noted that, as a practical matter,
nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very
nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians
43 Id. at 476.
4 Id. (footnotes omitted).
435 Id. n.*.
431 See note 378 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., PUFENDOR , supra note 154,
at 1294 (Defensive war is waged "[t]o preserve and protect ourselves and our posses-
sions"; offensive wars are "those by which we extort debts which are denied us, or under-
take to recover what has been unjustly taken from us, and to seek guarantees for the
future.") (emphasis added). Cf. notes 396-97 supra.
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will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that
cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fun-
damental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred rev-
erence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards
the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other
breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is
less urgent and palpable. 37
Much has been made-mostly for political purposes-of so-
called "presidential war-making." This practice, however, that
began with the birth of our nation under the Constitution, has
been necessary to "preserve, protect and defend" the nation.
The legislature is ill-equipped to employ and to direct our na-
tional resources to repel aggression and to secure public safety.
Accordingly, "though dictated by necessity," most of the war
power was placed by the Constitution in the President's hands.
He conducts war and concludes peace. To turn a state of hostil-
ity into one of amity, the President possesses all necessary pow-
ers-the power to direct and to employ U.S. armed forces, the
diplomacy power, and the peace-treaty power (subject to ratifi-
cation by the Senate).
To be sure, as demonstrated at length above, Congress has
various war-related powers that protect the people against exec-
utive usurpations. 38 If it were to become necessary, however, to
place under the President's command a large military force and
great wealth to support it, there would be no alternative. The
President must be permitted to employ those forces to resist
force, as he deems necessary, to protect public liberty.
The Framers found
that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics of
tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded upon
reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding
the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations.43
The power to declare war, like the authority to grant letters
of marque, does relate to "[s]ecurity against foreign danger."'440
131 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 5, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton).
438 See notes 206-358 and, accompanying text supra.
131 THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 5, at 205-06 (Alexander Hamilton).
440 Id. No. 41, at 261 (James Madison). Accord GROTIUS, supra note 159. at 308-09
("Subjects, being thus liable to the loss of their property, by the conduct of their fellow
subjects, or by that of the state, might sometimes feel it hardship, while on other occa-
sions, it would prove their greatest security against aggressions from the subjects of an-
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These powers, however, are not "essential to the common de-
fence." 441 Rather, they concern private security by public au-
thority. They are means of enforcing rights of private citizens
that could be avoided if offenses against the laws of nations were
defined and punished by foreign nations. Public liberty is pro-
tected by the President. It is his responsibility to guard the in-
terests of the United States "against the ambition or enmity of
other nations." While Congress is "more immediately the confi-
dential guardian[] of the rights and liberties of the people,"'44 2
the President is "the general Guardian of the National
interests. '443
CONCLUSION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION
It is the sworn duty of the President to "preserve, protect
and defend" the nation. To aid the President in accomplishing
that end, yet to safeguard liberty in the republican sense, the
Constitution invests Congress with the power to make direct
requisitions on the people to provide the means of war. Once
U.S. armed forces are placed into the hands of the Commander-
in-Chief, with money for their support, the President has the
power to use those forces to protect public liberty.
A declaration of war is not required for defensive wars,
which includes military action taken to defend other nations. It
also is not necessary before engaging in hostilities for the pur-
pose of punishing an aggressor state. Rather, a declaration of
war is part of the legislature's private war power and functions
to authorize, publicly, private acts of war, to redress individual
injuries (suffered by citizens and caused by individual foreign-
ers) or to confer upon citizens peculiar rights and to impose on
them certain duties that may arise from war.
As mentioned at the outset of this article, a contemporary
application of this allocation of constitutional war powers is the
recent Gulf War. Fifty-four members of Congress brought suit to
other power.") (emphasis added).
441 Id. No. 23, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton). See note 206 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, these authorities are unlike "the power of raising armies and equipping
fleets" that is connected to the power to declare war but also "is involved in the power of
self-defence." Id. No. 41, at 261 (James Madison).
44 THE FEDEALIT No. 49, supra note 5, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison).
443 MADISON'S NoTES, supra note 4, at 600 (Gouverneur Morris).
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enjoin the President from ordering an attack by U.S. armed
forces against Iraq without first securing a declaration of war or
some "other explicit congressional authorization for such action"
(the provision for which clearly was left out of my copy of the
Constitution).44 The request for a preliminary injunction was
denied.44
5
While the court's holding was correct, the court, in dicta,
found that the constitutional provision that vests in Congress
the power to declare war is an "unambiguous direction '440 that
makes it "clear that congressional approval is required if Con-
gress desires to become involved" 447 in the process of deciding
whether U.S. armed forces should attack an aggressor nation,
such as Iraq. At this point, it is not necessary to repeat the rea-
sons that demonstrate why the court misunderstood this "unam-
biguous direction." Instead, I will elaborate on the court's pri-
mary citation to support its position. The court wrote that, "Etlo
the extent that this unambiguous direction requires construction
or explanation" (as it obviously does),
it is provided by the framers' comments that they felt it to be unwise
to entrust the momentous power to involve the nation in a war to the
President alone."
8
Cautious that I might seem remiss in that, in this long article, I
have not cited (with respect to this issue) the court's single ref-
erence, I shall discuss it now. To support its proposition that
Congress has, in effect, like the Confederate Congress, "the sole
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and
war,''449 or, like the British monarch, "the sole prerogative of
making war and peace, '450 the court cited one of the essays in
4"' Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1143 (D.D.C. 1990).
4, The decision was based on a finding that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
Id. at 1149-52. The discussion of the ripeness issue in which the court noted that "only if
the majority of the Congress seeks relief... may it be entitled to receive it," id., at 1151,
itself convincingly shows that the court erred in denying the motion for a preliminary
injunction on other grounds raised by the executive. Indeed, I believe that the case
should have been dismissed for lack of standing. What is not revealed in the opinion is
why there was any need for discussion beyond that necessary to resolve the issue.
448 Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1145.
448 Id. at 1144 (footnote omitted).
"'See note 384 and accompanying text supra.
See note 385 and accompanying text supra.
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The Federalist (No. 75).45'
In that paper, Hamilton demonstrated that it would be un-
wise to entrust the treaty-making power to the President
alone.452 It did not discuss employing armed forces other than to
emphasize that the President alone is responsible for "the em-
ployment of the common strength." 3 Hamilton did note in that
paper, however, that the House of Representatives should have
no role in the treaty-making power because it (unlike the Senate
alone) lacks the requisite qualities.
Accurate ,and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady
and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensi-
bility to national character; decision, secrecy, and despatch, are in-
compatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.'"
In sum, the House of Representatives should not participate in
the treaty-making power, because it is less like the executive of-
fice than is the Senate. The House does not share any of the
attributes of the office of the President that were fashioned to
direct and to employ the armed forces of the United States most
effectively. Thus, Congress plays no role in the use of U.S.
armed forces once placed in the hands of the Commander-in-
Chief (save for passing necessary and proper laws and for pre-
scribing rules for the government and regulation of the armed
forces).
With respect to the recent Gulf War, Saddam Hussein, the
sovereign authority of Iraq, by committing acts of aggression,
having attacked Kuwait and having threatened Saudi Arabia,
declared himself and his nation to be public enemies of the
United States and of the community of civilized nations. The
Commander-in-Chief determined that these actions "pose[d] a
direct threat to neighboring countries and to vital U.S. interests
in the Persian Gulf region. '" 55 It was within the President's con-
stitutional war power, without any additional permission con-
ferred by Congress, to use U.S. armed forces to "protect and de-
fend" public liberty against Iraq and, to that end, if the
Commander-in-Chief were to deem it necessary, to punish the
451 752 F. Supp. at 1144 n.6.
4'2 See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 5, at 486-87 (Alexander Hamilton).
4' Id. at 486.
"54 Id. at 488. See also note 358 and accompanying text supra.
4H5 HR. Doc. No. 225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
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delinquent nation.
Once Congress gathers the means of war by direct requisi-
tions on the people, the President commands the forces and
money raised and must employ the "sinew of war" as he deems
necessary to "protect and defend" the nation. Congress's power
is limited to direct intrusions into an individual's life, liberty,
and property and to authorization of private acts of war. Once
the direct requisitions on the people are made, the force is
placed in the President's hands to protect public liberty. The
President's defense power clearly includes collective self defense;
Congress emphatically is denied a consultative role in determin-
ing the use of the means of war placed under the President's
command. Accordingly, no legislative authorization is necessary
before a President commits U.S. armed forces to war against for-
eign aggressor nations; thus, no legislative authority was neces-
sary before the President could commit forces to war against
Iraq.
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